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What is a substate constitution?
Substate constitutions are broadly understood as written legal instruments that limit and 
structure political power at the substate level, with legal supremacy regarding other substate 
laws. Their primary goals are to define the specific governance system of the substate entity, 
and often to codify citizen rights within its territory. They may also serve to delineate the 
political community and identity at the substate level. Substate entities, in turn, can be 
defined as territorially delineated constitutive parts of a country or state.
This paper examines substate constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings—in 
both federal and unitary (or hybrid) states—adopted after the end of the Cold War starting 
in 1991. The universe of cases comprises 10 countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros 
(Anjouan), Ethiopia, Indonesia (Aceh and Papua), Papua New Guinea (PNG, Bougainville), 
Russia (Chechnya and Dagestan), Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan and Sudan.
How do substate constitutions come about?
Substate constitution-building processes often seek to assert the substate entity’s 
distinctiveness from the central state and/or from other substate entities. Yet substate 
constitutions do not necessarily imply enhanced autonomy for the substate entity. The level 
of autonomy from central-state institutions crucially depends on the degree of ‘constitutional 
space’ that is granted to substate entities.
Constitutional space, in turn, is the degree to which substate entities can define their own 
goals and establish their own government institutions and processes. The constitutional space 
is usually defined in the central-state (i.e. national) constitution, and sometimes in peace 
agreements and/or transitional political arrangements. Furthermore, substate constitutional 
frameworks are subordinate in legal status to the central-state constitution.
The scope of the constitutional space depends on four additional factors: (a) the 
bargaining power of substate regarding central-state negotiators; (b) the way in which states 
form and devolve political power, either by unifying pre-existing states or through devolution 
of power within a unitary framework, whereby the latter will often have a more limited 
constitutional space; (c) the need to establish asymmetrical arrangements, in which one or 
more substate entities has comparatively more constitutional space than others; and (d) the 
different purposes underlying the emergence of substate constitutions, either to recognize and 
accommodate differences or to emphasize national unity and increase state efficiency, in 
which case constitutional space will be more limited.
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Whatever the resulting scope of the constitutional space, substate entities might sometimes 
decide not to make full use of it, either by emulating central-state structures or refraining 
from engaging in a constitution-building process at all. Alternatively, they may push for 
more constitutional space when the latter is considered insufficient, which can cause 
disagreements between both levels of government.
Why do substate constitutions come about?
In fragile and conflict-affected states, substate constitutions are often the result of a political 
settlement that includes assurances of increased constitutional space (and autonomy) for 
substate entities. In other words, the central state might be interested in accommodating 
distinct political communities within the state’s overall constitutional framework in order to 
prevent and/or manage conflict.
For substate entities—especially those with concentrated minority and/or marginalized 
groups—the reasons for engaging in constitution-building processes often concern: (a) legally 
(and politically) recognizing their distinctiveness, (b) legitimizing both substate authorities 
and the entity as a whole, and (c) either incentivizing innovation in constitutional design or 
attempting to offer a degree of institutional stability within the substate entity, in the absence 
of a settled institutional framework at the centre.
The process of building substate constitutions
The constitution-building process at the substate level is defined by the constitutional space. 
The constitutional space can be the result of a unilateral decision from central-state 
authorities, or it may reflect the political settlement parties have reached, further establishing 
the degree to which substate entities can define their own institutions and processes.
This paper delineates three ways in which substate institutional frameworks are defined: 
(a) the peace agreement and/or transitional political arrangement sets the initial parameters of 
the substate entity’s institutional framework, which are then expanded in the central-state 
constitution; (b) neither the peace agreement nor the central-state constitution provides 
many details about the institutional framework of substate entities, thereby granting 
considerable constitutional space to the latter, but also enabling central-state constitutions to 
reclaim constitutional space without the need for constitutional amendments; and (c) while 
the central-state constitution might be silent regarding the institutional framework of 
substate entities, peace agreements and/or transitional political arrangements might include 
significant details.
Process design can be more or less implicit or explicit in the central-state constitution, but 
comprises three main stages:
1. Drafting and adoption. Substate constitutions are usually prepared and adopted either 
by the substate legislature or by a constituent assembly at the substate level, with the 
actual drafting usually conducted by an appointed committee (part of the constituent 
assembly or sub-state legislature). Substate constitutional referendums are extremely 
rare. There are some interesting variations: sometimes drafting is conducted by an 
extra-parliamentary commission (e.g. Bougainville), or central-state institutions 
prepare model constitutions to be adapted by the drafting committees (e.g. South 
Sudan); central-state institutions might be responsible for adopting the substate 
constitution (e.g. Indonesia); finally, some central-state constitutions do not specify 
which body is in charge of drafting and adopting sub-state constitutions (i.e. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Comoros and Somalia).
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2. Pre-adoption certification process. While it is not a necessary element in substate 
constitution-building processes, where this is required, it usually involves a 
Constitutional/Supreme Court that endorses the constitution as respecting the 
principles and values outlined in the central-state constitution (e.g. South Africa, 
Comoros). Sometimes the responsibility falls on an executive body at the central-state 
level (e.g. Bougainville (PNG), Sudan or South Sudan), although its lack of 
independence can delegitimize the certification process and/or the draft to be 
certified.
3. Post-adoption review. Substate constitutional frameworks are subordinate to central-
state constitutions, and hence most countries have a Constitutional/Supreme Court in 
charge of upholding the central-state constitution where there is a dispute with (or 
between) substate constitutions after adoption of the latter. There can be variations 
regarding the subject(s) allowed to bring cases to court, as well as regarding informal 
ways of resolving such disputes before bringing them to the courts. At the same time, 
the independence of the Constitutional/Supreme Court is critical to the legitimacy of 
the rulings.
Other important process-related factors include:
• Timing/timelines. Timelines are usually mentioned only in peace agreements and/or 
transitional political arrangements, not in central-state constitutions. Provided they 
are realistic, they might provide structure to the post-conflict substate constitution-
building processes.
• Inclusion in establishing the constitutional space and drafting the substate constitution. 
Where the constitutional space is negotiated as part of a political settlement process, 
the level of inclusion can vary greatly, with either elites dominating the process or 
substate negotiators representing diverse groups. Regarding the drafting of the 
substate constitution, there is a growing consensus that there needs to be a certain 
level of local input into structuring the substate authority and the power therein. 
However, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, public participation is often not 
mandated by the central-state constitution or any other arrangement. Furthermore, it 
is difficult to gauge the extent to which public participation has played a significant 
role in these contexts.
• The role of the international community. The role of the international community in 
substate constitution-building processes depends not only on the needs of the substate 
entity, but also on the needs (and the demand) of central-state institutions. Therefore 
international involvement in substate constitution-building has usually been based on 
the express agreement of the central-state government. International engagement 
might involve: (a) expert advisory services to key stakeholders at the central and 
substate levels; (b) guaranteeing the implementation of agreements and mediating 
disputes; (c) assisting in organizing workshops/roundtables; and (d) capacity building 
of substate institutions and key stakeholders involved in these processes.
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Substate constitutional design
The overall constitution-building process will determine specific constitutional design issues 
in the substate constitution, as well as how they compare with the central-state constitution. 
Key issues to consider regarding constitutional design in substate constitutions include:
• System of government. In most cases considered in this paper, the design of the substate 
executive—using a parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential system—closely 
resembles that of the central state. One clear exception is Bougainville (PNG), where 
the central state and the substate entity use a parliamentary and a semi-presidential 
system, respectively.
• Form of legislature. Only Comoros and Bougainville/PNG have unicameral legislatures 
at both the central and substate levels. In most federations except for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the central-state legislature is bicameral whereas the substate legislatures 
are unicameral. This seems to follow the pattern that federal states usually have second 
chambers for regional representation, whereas the legislatures of substate entities do 
not necessarily have to perform this function. In Indonesia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (except for the Brčko District), all legislatures are bicameral.
• Constitutional amendment procedures. Central and substate constitutions are usually 
more difficult to amend or replace than ordinary laws. Making constitutional 
amendments at the substate level is usually easier than at the central-state level, 
although sometimes it is equally hard at both levels, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina or 
Ethiopia. The authority to initiate amendments at the substate level typically involves 
the substate legislature and/or executive, with different levels of central-state 
consultation required. Substate entities are usually not formally involved in 
amendment processes at the central-state level, although substate views are often aired 
in second chambers in the central legislatures. The constitutions of PNG and 
Comoros are the only two in which central-state institutions cannot single-handedly 
change provisions related to the autonomy of its substate entities.
• Regulation of local government. Both central-state and substate constitutions considered 
in this paper provide for local government, with the exception of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which only makes special arrangements for the Brčko District; the 
substate constitutions of Amhara (Ethiopia) and Bougainville also contain similar 
special arrangements. The level of detail in the central-state constitution with regard 
to provisions for local government varies widely, with Somalia at one end of the 
spectrum—contemplating a local government level, but offering no further detail—
and Indonesia, Russia and South Africa at the other end of the spectrum—with highly 
developed arrangements in the central-state constitution. Such differences are also 
found in substate constitutions, with Western Cape (South Africa), Puntland 
(Somalia), Aceh and Papua (Indonesia) including more details regarding local 
government provisions.
• Provision of group minority rights. Most central and substate constitutions studied here 
provide for special regimes of enforceable group rights to protect minorities. The 
central-state constitutions of Indonesia, PNG and Somalia do not include specific 
minority rights, although some Indonesian provisions recognize traditional 
communities’ customary and cultural rights. Of the substate entities, neither Papua 
nor Aceh’s special autonomy laws refer to minority rights.
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• Provision of substate symbols. Many of the substate constitutions under consideration 
provide for substate symbols that are different from those of the central state, 
although Indonesia makes explicit what is implicit in other cases by expressly stating 
that substate symbols do not signify potential substate independence.
Impact on conflict prevention and conflict management
The impact of substate constitution-building on conflict prevention and/or management is 
difficult to gauge. While substate constitutional frameworks are important tools for 
addressing substate demands for distinctiveness and self-government, they are not a panacea. 
Only in Bougainville (PNG) and Aceh (Indonesia) is the lack of (recorded) violent conflict 
clearly correlated with the adoption of a substate constitution. Three other cases—Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (including the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Comoros and South 
Africa—have experienced central-state constitution-building processes after conflict. The 
resulting constitutions have included relatively ample substate constitutional space (either in 
legal provisions or in practice), which may have contributed to preventing or managing 
(recorded) violent conflict. For different reasons, violent conflict has continued and even 
surged in Chechnya (Russia), South Sudan and Sudan during and after substate constitution-
building processes, leading observers to conclude that these processes have had a limited 
impact (if any) on conflict management.
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Key recommendations
1. In order to understand whether (and how) substate constitution-building might help 
address the relationship between substate communities and the central state, it is 
important to examine the relationship of territory and identity to conflict. This 
relationship is shaped by the social diversity of the country as a whole, the territorial 
concentration of ethnically homogeneous groups, its history of decentralization within 
central-state institutions, and claims for autonomy among one or more territorially 
concentrated groups.
2. Once authorities at the central and substate levels decide to embark on substate 
constitution-building, it is key to understand that this process begins by defining the 
constitutional space, either in the central-state constitution or a peace agreement.
3. When considering the drafting of substate constitutions, it is important to remember 
that the right to produce a substate constitution does not necessarily equate to more 
autonomy. The level of autonomy of substate entities will be defined in the central-
state constitution, or sometimes in peace agreements and/or transitional political 
arrangements.
4. Defining the constitutional space, whether in the central-state constitution or in a 
peace agreement, often includes determining the process by which the substate 
constitution is drafted, adopted and certified. Stakeholders at both levels should put 
some thought into this, especially where the central-state constitution will be built 
anew or fundamentally amended.
5. To give substate entities enhanced ownership over their constitutional dispensation, 
the central-state constitution should allow substate institutions to adopt/promulgate 
the substate constitution as much as possible, while developing a procedure for an 
independent body to ensure compliance with the central-state constitution.
6. Referendums are often not advisable or feasible in the ratification of substate 
constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected states (of the cases examined here, only 
Chechnya had a referendum). This heightens the need for robust and genuine public 
participation in the development of the substate constitution.
7. The timing for drafting and adopting substate constitutions should be carefully 
considered. The context may demand more urgent constitution-building processes in 
some substate entities than in others, and therefore different tracks might need to be 
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applied for different substate entities. Where they are used, timelines should be 
realistic.
8. Substate constitutions are mostly easier to amend in practice than central-state 
constitutions. To enhance ownership at the substate level, a central role should be 
given to substate institutions and stakeholders in initiating and enacting substate 
constitutional amendments, while ensuring that proposed/enacted amendments are 
compliant with the central-state constitution.
9. Substate constitutions should specifically protect minorities and their rights within the 
substate entity, whether or not the central-state constitution includes specific 
provisions to protect minorities throughout the state’s territory.
10. The international community must seek the express agreement of the central 
government to engage in substate constitution-building processes.
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1. Introduction
Autonomy for substate entities with territorially concentrated societal groups is increasingly 
understood as a peacebuilding tool in ethnically divided and conflict-affected settings. 
Recognizing the differences of societal groups that might have been marginalized in the past, 
and guaranteeing (at least some of) their demands for political voice and power, is one of the 
main goals of autonomy (Ghai 2000: 8–11).
Autonomy for substate entities can take a number of different forms. While some states 
devolve governing powers to all their substate entities, others devolve power to one or a few 
substate entities based on specific historical and/or identity claims. The degree to which 
power is devolved may also vary greatly: some substate entities have a high degree of 
autonomy from the central state coupled with decision-making power and representation in 
central-state institutions (e.g. the senate or upper chamber); others have no representation at 
the centre but high levels of autonomy; and still others enjoy less autonomy and no say at the 
centre. While devolution can be the result of a federal state structure, unitary states also often 
use their central-state constitutions (or other legislation) to regulate different degrees of 
devolution to (at least some of) their substate entities.
Some substate entities are allowed or required to draft their own constitutions; this 
scenario is the focus of this paper. Since the end of the Cold War, 17 countries—nine federal 
and eight unitary states—have had constitution-building processes in all or some of their 
substate entities (Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Israel, Papua New Guinea  (PNG), Russia, Somalia, South Africa, South 
Sudan  (after independence), Sudan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan and 
Venezuela); countries in bold text were conflict affected before the substate constitution-
building process took place. China (Hong Kong and Macau), Ukraine (Crimea), Uzbekistan 
(Karakalpakstan) and Venezuela did not have substate constitution-building processes as a 
result of intrastate conflict, nor did Azerbaijan (Nakhchivan), where the conflict was of an 
interstate character. Since Israel and the UK have very particular constitutional traditions 
that make generalizations alongside the other cases difficult, they are excluded from the 
analysis (see Box 1 for a full list).
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Box 1. Countries not included in the analysis
This paper does not address the following: countries on the United Nations list of non-self-governing territories; 
countries in which substate entities might have drafted but not yet adopted constitutions (e.g. Iraq (Kurdistan), 
Philippines (Bangsamoro Basic Law)); and substate entities in which the adoption of substate constitutions was 
meant to ensure independence from the central state, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), Nagorno 
Karabakh (Azerbaijan/Armenia), Somaliland (Somalia) and Transnistria (Moldova). 
One additional case not considered in this paper is Kosovo, where the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 (10 June 1999) established ‘an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’ (art. 10), which eventually led to Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 
2008.
The paper also disregards the Special Statute of the Province of Cabinda (Angola)—an annex to the 2006 
Memorandum of Understanding for the Peace and Reconciliation of the Province of Cabinda between the State of 
the Republic of Angola and the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue—as the authors were unable to confirm its 
implementation. Similarly, the paper does not deal with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord (1997) in Bangladesh as 
this never envisaged a substate constitution for the three hill districts of Rangamati, Khagrachchari and 
Bandarban. In any case, central-state legislation providing for greater autonomy to the districts pursuant to the 
accord have been declared unconstitutional by the High Court of Bangladesh since 2010, on the grounds that even 
the limited devolution proposed by the legislation violated the principle of the unitary state in the Bangladeshi 
Constitution.
Finally, the paper also excludes from consideration the recent creation of several federal states and autonomous 
regions within the Union of India. Some of these have been undertaken in furtherance of negotiated settlements 
to violent conflicts between the Indian Government and substate actors after 1991. However, some of these 
negotiated settlements do not meet the criteria of substate constitution used here, such as the 1993 
Memorandum of Settlement between the Tripura State Government and the All Tripura Tribal Force, and others 
define institutional arrangements for entities that would not fall under the definition of substate entity used here, 
such as the 1993 Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord) and the 2003 Memorandum of Settlement on 
Bodoland Territorial Council.
In fragile and conflict-affected settings, constitution-making at the substate level often 
aims not only to restructure political institutions, but also to formally recognize historical 
and/or ethnic particularities of the substate territory. The articulation of political as well as 
cultural or symbolic aspects of substate distinctiveness in a substate constitution might help 
realize the desire for self-government. However, the shape, form and parameters of substate 
constitutions vary widely across contexts, and the power to adopt a substate constitution does 
not always denote greater autonomy.
This Policy Paper aims to fill a significant gap in the policy and academic literatures 
regarding the process and design of substate constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings, and their role in the broader political-settlement and peace-building process. The 
academic and policy literature on substate constitution-building (see Marshfield 2011; 
Saunders 2011) mainly focuses on federal systems in developed countries. Furthermore, 
single case studies (e.g. Ayele 2014; Elazar 1982; Murray and Maywald 2006; Saunders 
2011; Tarr 1999) are more frequent than comparative assessments (e.g. Burgess and Tarr 
2012; Dinan 2008; Ginsburg and Posner 2010; Laforest and Lecours 2016). In addressing 
this gap, this paper will explore the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of substate constitution-building, as well 
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as the impact on both constitutional design and conflict management at the substate level. 
Issues related to the implementation of substate constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings are beyond the scope of this paper.
This paper was developed following the Third Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict 
Constitution-building held in December 2016 (Molloy 2017), which focused on substate 
constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This workshop was organized by the 
International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the 
Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law and the Global Justice Academy in association 
with the Political Settlements Research Programme at the University of Edinburgh. The 
paper draws on a number of existing and new data sources, such as the United Nations 
Peacemaker peace agreements directory, the Constitute database developed by the 
Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Chicago and the University of Texas 
at Austin, data on interim constitutions collected by International IDEA (Zulueta-Fülscher 
2015), as well as original data from substate constitutions that is available online. For some 
countries, the substate constitutional texts were either not available online in any language 
(e.g. South Sudan and Sudan), or were only available for some substate entities, and were not 
always officially translated into English (e.g. for Ethiopia, only the Amhara constitution was 
published online). To distinguish conflict from non-conflict-affected states, the paper uses 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and examines substate constitution-building 
processes after conflict and after the end of the Cold War.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a conceptual framework that defines 
substate entities and substate constitutions, including the key concept of ‘constitutional 
space’. It also explains some of the reasons why substate entities adopt substate constitutions. 
Section 3 elaborates the universe of cases analysed: fragile and conflict-affected settings after 
the end of the Cold War. Section 4 examines how central-state constitutions provide 
constitutional space for their substate entities, and the resulting process-related issues for 
substate constitution-building. Section 5 discusses some of the determining factors for the 
substate constitution-building process, such as its timing, inclusiveness and the role of the 
international community. Section 6 discusses the design of substate constitutional 
frameworks, and section 7 presents conclusions. The paper also includes three Annexes. 
Annex A lists the parameters for the substate institutional framework in selected cases. Annex 
B provides details of the drafting and adoption of selected substate constitutions. Annex C 
lists links to substate constitutions referred to in the paper.
International IDEA   13
2. Substate constitutions: a conceptual framework
2. Substate constitutions: a 
conceptual framework
What are substate entities and substate constitutions?
Substate entities can be broadly defined as territorially defined constitutive parts of a country 
or state (Molloy 2017). They may be called, for example, regions, provinces, Länder, 
departments, federal member states, autonomous communities, entities or cantons. Although 
they are often the most politically salient stratum below the central-state level, they may 
subsist alongside other levels of government in complex multilevel systems. Spain, for 
instance, has 17 autonomous communities, each of which includes a maximum of eight 
provinces. Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of two entities (Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina); the latter consists of 10 cantons, each of which has 
its own substate constitution.
The overwhelming majority of states do not allow substate entities to have their own 
constitutional framework, whereas some states require  them to draft and adopt substate 
constitutions. While substate constitutions are more common in federal or quasi-federal 
states, unitary states may permit them as well (Marshfield 2011: 1157). In unitary states, this 
can occur through constitutions or quasi-constitutional frameworks—statutes of autonomy 
or organic laws, for instance—that devolve power to territorial subdivisions.
Substate constitutions are broadly understood here as written legal instruments that limit 
and structure political power at the substate level, and maintain legal supremacy with respect 
to other substate laws (see Marshfield 2011: 1153, 1165; Saunders 2011: 859–60; Elazar 
1982: 11; Regassa 2009: 37). Their primary purpose is to define the governance system of 
the substate entity, and often to codify citizen rights within its territory (Molloy 2017). This 
paper only assesses stand-alone substate constitutions; it excludes substate constitutional 
arrangements that are only included in the central-state constitution or peace agreements).
While some substate entities may seek to increase their autonomy from the central state via 
a substate constitution, such documents do not necessarily imply enhanced autonomy for the 
substate entity, as evidenced in Ethiopia, and even in South Africa. The act of substate 
constitution-making entails an important symbolic assertion of distinctiveness. More 
substantively, a substate constitution might help build the authority and legitimacy of 
substate entities with regard to the central state and further define—and sometimes expand
—the political power reserved for them (Marshfield 2011: 1153). However, substate 
constitutional frameworks are legally subordinate to the central-state constitution (see 
Saunders 2011: 854; Marshfield 2011: 1159), which usually defines both the level of 
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jurisdiction of substate entities and their relationship with the central state (Watts 2000: 
954), thereby specifying the substate entity’s constitutional space.
What is constitutional space, and what determines its scope?
Constitutional space is the degree to which substate entities can define their own goals and 
establish their own governmental institutions and processes  (Tarr 2011: 1133–34; Marshfield 
2011: 1161). This space is usually defined in the central-state constitution (Burgess and Tarr 
2012: 7; see also Marshfield 2011: 1159), although sometimes it is also detailed in peace 
agreements and/or transitional political arrangements. The specific provisions in the central-
state constitution might further be the result of negotiations between stakeholders from the 
substate entity/entities and the central state, sometimes as part of the broader political 
settlement process after conflict or during transition. Sometimes, however, the constitutional 
space might be imposed from above, with limited or no participation from the substate 
entities.
The constitutional space can include, for example, the power to: draft, amend or replace 
the substate constitution; set government goals; define specific rights to be protected by the 
substate entity; structure and divide power among government institutions; create offices; 
define the process by which laws are enacted in the substate entity; determine the mode of 
selecting public officials; determine the terms of office and the mode of (and bases for) 
removing officials; establish an official language; institute mechanisms of direct democracy; 
create and structure local government; specify who are citizens of the substate entity; and 
establish qualifications for voting for officials within the constituent unit (Tarr 2011: 1134, 
note 5).
The establishment of the constitutional space varies substantially according to the context, 
particularly the sequencing of the post-conflict settlement process, from political negotiation 
to legal formalization. Notionally, constitutional space is forged as part of peace negotiations, 
and is formalized with the drafting and adoption of an (interim) constitutional framework, 
and implemented when the substate entities draft and adopt their own constitutions, as 
happened in Bougainville (PNG), Western Cape (South Africa), Sudan and South Sudan. In 
some of the case studies analysed here, such as Bougainville (PNG), the substate 
constitutional space was created as part of the negotiated settlement to a territorial conflict, 
which was then formalized through legal amendments to the central-state constitution, and 
implemented through an act of substate constitution-making. In Ethiopia, South Africa, 
South Sudan and Sudan, the substate constitutional space was provided as part of a much 
broader process of post-conflict constitutional transformation. The political settlement for 
Aceh (Indonesia) was negotiated between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian 
Government, with international facilitation, and articulated in the 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding. The memorandum set out the parameters of the constitutional space, but the 
constitutional framework was promulgated through a special autonomy law enacted 
exclusively by central-state institutions—in a similar way as the 2001 Laws on Special 
Autonomy for both Aceh and West Papua—following the Indonesian Constitution (see 
Section 4 and Annexes A and B). In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia, the substate 
entities carved out their constitutional space before the central-state constitutions were 
adopted.
The way in which the constitutional space is decided on or negotiated, however, does not 
necessarily affect its scope, which broadly depends on a number of factors, including:
1. the bargaining power of substate as compared to central-state negotiators (see 
Leftwich 2010);
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2. how states form and devolve political power, either as a union of pre-existing states, in 
which case the substate constitutional space might be ample, or by devolving power 
within a unitary framework to new substate entities, where resistance to devolution 
might limit the constitutional space (see Burgess and Tarr 2012: 12–13; Watts 2000: 
945; Regassa 2009: 40);
3. the existence of asymmetrical arrangements, as the reasons for asymmetry—the 
recognition of a particular (historical) identity, for instance—often require more 
constitutional space for those substate entities (see Burgess and Tarr 2012: 12–13; 
Mcgarry 2007); and
4. the different purposes underlying devolution, either to recognize and accommodate 
territorially concentrated and ethnically defined groups—such as PNG, Indonesia—in 
which case the constitutional space tends to be broader, or to recognize but emphasize 
national unity and increase state efficiency (Burgess and Tarr 2012: 13; see also Tarr 
2011), in which case the constitutional space might be more limited, such as South 
Africa or South Sudan.
Whether the political settlement process, and resulting constitution, includes broad 
constitutional space or not, substate entities may decide not to make full use of it—perhaps 
emulating the central-state institutional structure and rights framework instead of designing 
their own, as occurred in Ethiopia and South Africa. However, substate entities might push 
for more constitutional space (including more governmental powers), and disagreements 
might arise between both levels of government over the appropriate contours of the 
constitutional space (Molloy 2017).
Substate entities may challenge the constitutional space for multiple reasons. For example, 
there may be changing interests and demands at the substate level, or shifts in the balance of 
power between groups that have different perceptions of the amount of constitutional space 
needed. Central-state institutions might also renege on the constitutional space technically 
granted, as their interests and demands might also change over time, as happened in 
Ethiopia, Russia and Sudan (discussed in more detail below), which may compel substate 
entities to try again to expand their constitutional space. In other cases, central government 
negotiators might agree to grant a certain degree of constitutional space to substate entities as 
part of peace negotiations or a general move towards increased devolution, while other 
central-state institutions such as the legislature or the judiciary might try to curtail or even 
reject such commitments (Molloy 2017), as occurred in the Philippines regarding the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law. Finally, after a substate constitution is adopted, its implementation 
may trigger judicial review and the curtailment of the constitutional space.
Where constitutional space is less constrained, the substate constitution might be able to 
respond to specific challenges faced by the substate entity. If successful, this constitutional 
experimentation might be emulated by other substate entities and the central-state 
constitution (Burgess and Tarr 2012: 4). If the constitutional space is more constrained, 
institutional and rights provisions might either be more similar to the ones provided by the 
central-state constitution or be prescribed from above (see Ginsburg and Posner 2010: 
1601). Ethiopia is perhaps an exception: its central-state constitution does not significantly 
constrain substate entities in making their constitutions. However, due to the political 
context (including the one-party dominant political system), Ethiopia’s substate constitutions 
replicate the central-state constitution almost entirely in terms of institutions and rights 
(Regassa 2009: 51; Ayele 2014). For more information see sections 4 and 6, and annexes A 
and B to this paper.
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Why might substate entities seek substate constitutions?
The reasons for substate constitutional frameworks can be manifold, and they can be 
considered from two different angles: that of the substate entity and that of the central state. 
In Marshfield’s study of substate constitutionalism, he identifies a number of reasons why 
central states might support substate constitutions. The first, and most relevant to the present 
discussion, is that allowing substate entities to draft and adopt substate constitutions might 
enable the central state to accommodate distinct political communities within the state’s 
overall constitutional framework, thus preventing or managing conflicts related to the (real or 
perceived) lack of autonomy and level of economic and/or political marginalization 
(Marshfield 2011: 1153–54).
From the perspective of substate entities, there are three main reasons to draft and adopt 
substate constitutions. First, substate constitutional frameworks might give substate entities 
the ability to govern themselves and  the ‘ability to determine how  they will govern 
themselves’ (Marshfield 2011: 1170). Especially when minorities and marginalized groups 
are territorially concentrated—and when they share a specific identity that sets them apart 
from other substate entities or the state as a whole—a substate constitutional framework 
might allow them not only to formally define their governmental structures and processes, 
but also to recognize their historical claims for autonomy and relevant substate symbols (see 
also Watts 2000: 946). Second, the substate constitution might contribute to the legitimacy 
of substate authorities, or the entity as a whole, in the eyes of the substate citizenry because it 
empowers substate authorities to entrench devolved powers—for example by defining the 
structure of government, thereby establishing formal limits between central- and substate-
level powers. Third, in more stable or peaceful states, substate entities might be able to 
experiment with their constitutional designs, taking advantage of the relative flexibility to 
amend substate constitutional frameworks compared to central-state constitutions (see 
Marshfield 2011: 1184; Section 6). However, in conflict-affected settings with weak 
institutions (and perhaps a central-state constitution still in the making), substate 
constitutions might offer a degree of institutional stability from below by allowing substate 
entities to start building an institutional framework even in the absence of a central 
institutional framework, such as in Somalia.
In fragile and conflict-affected states, substate constitutions are often the result of a 
political settlement that includes further assurances of increased autonomy as well as 
constitutional space for substate entities. Such a political settlement might result from: (a) the 
reconfiguration of power from a minority group to a majority group (as in post-apartheid 
South Africa), creating self-government demands from minorities at the substate level; (b) the 
realization that no group has a sufficient majority, and that therefore every significant 
minority group should be allowed a degree of independence in designing territorially based 
political institutions and processes (as in post-war Ethiopia); or (c) a stalemate resulting from 
intrastate war waged between the state and one or more non-state actors vying for greater 
autonomy/independence (as in Indonesia, the Philippines and PNG).
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Categorizing substate constitutions
This paper examines substate constitutions in both federal and unitary (or hybrid) states. 
Especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings, unitary states and hybrid systems—quasi-
federations, constitutionally decentralized unions, confederations involving federal elements, 
and other innovative autonomy regimes (see Watts 2000)—might have constitutional 
frameworks as conflict management tools for at least some of their substate entities. These 
constitutional frameworks can take the form of constitutions, basic laws, statutes of 
autonomy or special laws that define a substate entity’s structure of government.
Table 3.1. Post-Cold War states with substate constitutional frameworks
  Federal states Unitary states
Conflict-affected states Bosnia and Herzegovina
Comoros
Ethiopia






Indonesia (Aceh and Papua) 
Israel (Palestine)* 
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) 
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)*
Not conflict-affected Venezuela China (Hong Kong and Macau) 
Ukraine (Crimea) 
Uzbekistan
* Conflict-affected cases excluded from the analysis. 
The paper distinguishes fragile and conflict-affected from non-conflict-affected states by 
the level of conflict in the substate entity (and/or involving actors primarily located in/
around the substate entity) before the substate constitution was adopted (see Table 3.1). Out 
of the four non-conflict cases—China, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Venezuela—Venezuela 
stands out, as conflict has been ongoing there since at least 1989, but territorially 
concentrated groups have not been significantly involved and at least two-thirds of the 
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killings have been carried out by the government, according to UCDP data. Moreover, while 
most substate constitutions in Venezuela were adopted before the end of the Cold War, even 
as most of them were amended following the adoption of the 1999 central-state constitution, 
none of these amendment processes was visibly related to conflict management.
Substate constitutions in unitary and federal states
Federal constitutions recognize the relationship between central and substate entities, define 
distinct levels of government and guarantee a certain degree of autonomy for the substate 
entity (Watts 2000: 948–49). Constitutions in unitary states also often, but not always, 
involve ‘substantial elements of administrative and even legislative decentralization to 
subnational government’ (Watts 2000: 949), especially when they include territorially 
concentrated minorities or populations. Furthermore, central-state institutions in unitary 
states often have the legal authority to unilaterally reduce or expand the jurisdictional 
purview and constitutional space of substate entities (see Watts 2000: 949).
Currently there are 31 federal states in the world (Anderson 2008: 2; see Box 2). While the 
degree of autonomy can fundamentally vary from federation to federation and between 
substate entities, some federations allow or require substate entities to formalize their 
structure of government and relationship with the central state in substate constitutions, 
while others prohibit it. Federations that require  substates to adopt constitutions include 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, 
Iraq, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, 
Switzerland, the USA and Venezuela. Those that allow substate constitutions include Belau/
Palau, Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo, St. Kitts and Nevis, South Africa and the 
United Arab Emirates. Federations that expressly (or by implication) prohibit  substate 
constitutions include Belgium, India, Nigeria, Nepal and Pakistan.
While more unitary states devolved power asymmetrically via substate constitutional 
frameworks after the Cold War compared with during the Cold War, there are still few such 
arrangements among unitary states. Given that sovereignty is centralized in unitary states, 
they tend to be more resistant to the notion of substate constitutional space. During the Cold 
War, only two out of 15 states that permitted substate constitutional frameworks were 
unitary states: Tanzania and Spain (arguably, a quasi-federal state). After the Cold War, eight 
out of 17 states that created constitutions at the substate level were unitary states—
Azerbaijan, China, Indonesia, Israel, PNG, Ukraine, the UK and Uzbekistan.
Box 2. Substate constitutions in federal states
The count of 31 federal states (Anderson 2008: 2) includes Nepal, Somalia and South Sudan, which have emerged 
as federations since Anderson’s study was published. Of these federal states, 20 (Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belau/Palau, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Micronesia, Russia, Somalia, 
South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, the United States and Venezuela) have substate 
constitutions in some or all of their substate entities. Both India and Pakistan implicitly prohibit substate 
constitutions, but the region of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the border also has a substate constitution.
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Symmetrical and asymmetrical arrangements
The constitutional space might be offered symmetrically to all constitutive substate entities, 
or asymmetrically to only one or a few of them (see Watts 2000: 951). Some states that 
generally prohibit the adoption of substate constitutional frameworks might allow them in 
specific substate entities, such as in Aceh and Papua in Indonesia, and Jammu and Kashmir 
in India. In some cases the intensity with which particular substate entities want to enhance 
and formalize their autonomy with regard to the central state explains why some are granted 
more, or any, constitutional space (see Watts 2000: 946), such as Bougainville (PNG) and 
Aceh (Indonesia). Central-state institutions may grant constitutional space to some or all 
substate entities either to prevent (a resurgence of) conflict or to manage ongoing violent 
conflict dynamics, depending on how widespread the conflict is.
Of the 10 post-Cold War conflict-affected cases in the sample, all three unitary states—
Azerbaijan, Indonesia and PNG—enacted asymmetric forms of devolution in a substate 
constitutional framework. Only one federation—Russia—had an asymmetric arrangement 
for its substate entities; only the republics were allowed to draft and adopt substate 
‘constitutions’, while all other substate entities were permitted to draft ‘charters’ (see Annex 
A). In addition, the arrangement with the State of South Sudan before independence was 
asymmetric in nature between 2005 and 2011.
Impact of substate constitutions on conflict prevention and 
management
It is difficult to gauge the impact of substate constitution-building on conflict prevention 
and/or management. There are only two cases in which the lack of (recorded) violent conflict 
can clearly be correlated to the adoption of a substate constitution—Bougainville (PNG) and 
Aceh (Indonesia). In Papua (Indonesia), the 2001 Special Autonomy Law followed more 
than a decade of non-violent conflict, and even after the adoption of a substate constitution, 
the levels of conflict have remained low despite questions regarding implementation. 
Similarly, in Dagestan, violent conflict was only recorded in 1999, followed by its 2003 
Constitution. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the lack of conflict in the two 
latter substate entities resulted from their constitutional frameworks. 
Three other countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), Comoros and South Africa—have engaged in central-state constitution-
building processes after conflict. The resulting constitutions have included relatively ample 
substate constitutional space (in legal provisions or, in their absence, in practice), and may 
have helped prevent or manage (recorded) violent conflict. In Somalia, the 2011 Provisional 
Constitution set the stage for the formation of substate entities and the drafting of their 
constitutional frameworks. Since the adoption of the Transitional Constitution of Puntland 
Regional Government in April 2012, there has been no recorded violent conflict in this 
substate entity.
In Sudan, the conflict with South Sudan took centre stage until the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement was signed, which included provisions for both Sudanese and South 
Sudanese substate entities to draft and adopt substate constitutions. However, a number of 
armed groups have been continuously operating in northern Sudan—especially in Darfur, 
Southern and Northern Kordofan, and Blue Nile regions—since at least 2003, and substate 
constitution-building processes do not seem to have affected conflict management in these 
areas. The civil war that followed South Sudan’s independence in 2011 was provoked more 
by questions related to access to power than the structure of the state. However, the constant 
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increase in the number of substate entities that started in 2013 might have further boosted 
violent conflict throughout the country. 
During the first Chechen war (1994–96), the December 1995 Agreement on the Basic 
Principles of Relations between Russia and the Chechen Republic recognized the need to 
grant a special status to Chechnya as part of Russia, including through creating a substate 
constitution and other legislation. The legislation established the institutional framework of 
the Republic of Chechnya, but included no further guidelines. Furthermore, no later 
agreement mentioned the republic’s institutional structure, and the substate constitution was 
not adopted until 2003—during the second Chechen war (1999–2009). Conflict has 
continued in the region to date.
These cases therefore yield a mixed picture of the causal relationship between substate 
constitutions and conflict prevention and management. It is clear that, while substate 
constitutional frameworks are important tools for addressing substate demands for 
distinctiveness and self-government, they are not a panacea. Even in the relatively successful 
cases of Aceh and Bougainville, their use will only produce results if other relevant elements 
of a successful conflict transformation process are adequately addressed, not least the 
implementation of the constitutional framework agreed and promulgated after negotiations 
between stakeholders from the centre and substate entities. In some cases, substate 
constitutions seem to have had no impact at all (Sudan, South Sudan), whereas in others, 
substate constitution-building seems to be one of the few available options for rebuilding a 
post-conflict central state (Somalia). In Ethiopia and South Africa, a substate constitutional 
space was provided as part of a broader transformation driven primarily by factors other than 
substate demands, and this (coupled with other critical factors such as a one-party dominant 
political system at both the central and substate levels) may have contributed to the relative 
insignificance of the substate constitutional space subsequently. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the international community created the substate constitutional space as part of a forceful 
peace agreement that ended all (overt) violent conflict. The case of Russia is much more 
complicated; the substate constitutional space was reduced after Vladimir Putin became 
president, and the substate constitutions that were promulgated in conflict-affected regions 
were imposed from the centre, with little or no participation from substate stakeholders.
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constitution-building process
The constitutional space defines the substate constitution-building process, for example by 
influencing the following key issues:
• Is the substate entity allowed to design its own governing institutions?
• Who drafts and adopts the substate constitution?
• Does the final draft need certification from a central-state institution (usually a 
constitutional or supreme court), and how independent is this institution?
• Does any other central-state institution have the power to ratify or veto the draft 
before, after or instead of the certification process, and how independent is this 
institution?
• What institution is responsible for settling disputes between a substate and central-
state constitution, or calling for amendments to the substate constitution post-
adoption?
Designing the parameters for the substate institutional framework
Central-state constitutions vary in the degree to which they define the substate institutional 
framework. Sometimes the provisions related to constitutional space reflect a unilateral 
decision from central-state authorities with regard to substate entities, while in others they 
might reflect the political settlement the parties reached before the constitution was drafted 
and adopted (Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher 2016). This paper classifies countries into three 
distinct categories according to how they define the substate institutional framework (Annex 
A provides more detailed information on the parameters for the substate institutional 
framework).
In the first category, the peace agreement and/or interim political arrangement sets the 
initial parameters of the substate entity’s institutional framework, which are then expanded 
in the central-state constitution. Examples include Bougainville (PNG), the Comoros 2001 
Constitution (as amended in 2009) (see Annex A), the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (one of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutive entities), South Sudan, Sudan 
and South Africa. South Africa’s 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 Constitution establish 
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a (very similar) default provincial institutional framework, and allow provinces to adopt their 
own constitutional dispensations.
In the second group of countries, neither the peace agreement (and/or interim political 
arrangement) nor the central-state constitution provides many details about the institutional 
framework of substate entities, thereby granting considerable constitutional space to the 
latter. Examples include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Russia and Somalia. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the constitutions of both constitutive entities were adopted before the 
signing of the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an annex 
to the Dayton Agreement). Hence the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not 
constrain the constitutional space of the entities with regards to the system of government or 
structure of the state; it only broadly stipulated that they should conform to the central-state 
constitution. In Somalia, the constituent units that were envisioned in the 2012 Provisional 
Constitution had not yet been created when the constitution was adopted, and thus the 
constitutional space was understandably not addressed in the text. Such lack of detail, 
however, might enable central-state institutions to take back constitutional space effectively 
granted without having to amend the central-state constitution, as has happened for different 
reasons in Ethiopia and Russia.
Third, while the central-state constitution might not address the institutional framework 
of substate entities, peace agreements and/or transitional political arrangements between the 
central state and the substate entity (or entities) might include significant details in this 
regard, such as in Aceh (Indonesia).
Drafting and adopting the substate constitution
Substate constitutions are usually prepared and adopted by either the substate legislature or 
by a substate constituent assembly. An appointed committee (part of the constituent 
assembly or substate legislature) usually undertakes the actual drafting process. There are, 
however, some interesting variations in these practices. For example, in Bougainville the 
substate entity had an extra-parliamentary commission in charge of the drafting, and in 
Sudan and South Sudan the drafting committees discussed and adapted model constitutions 
drafted by central-state institutions. While the substate legislature is usually responsible for 
adopting a draft constitution, in Aceh and Papua the central state (the legislature and 
executive acted together) adopted the substate constitutional framework. Finally, only three 
of the central-state constitutions assessed in this paper did not specify the body/bodies in 
charge of drafting and adopting substate constitutions—the Constitution of the Union of 
Comoros, the Provisional Constitution of Somalia, and the Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (two of its three constitutive entities predated the drafting of the central-state 
constitution (Republika Srpska, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Furthermore, of the 
cases analysed in this paper, only Chechnya held, or had a mandate to hold, a referendum as 
part of the adoption process: two referendums were held to adopt the Chechen Constitution 
in 2003 and amendments to it in 2007 (see Table 4.1 and Annex B).
Certifying and ratifying the substate constitution before adoption
Not all substate constitution-building processes certify that substate constitutions conform 
with the central-state constitution. Where it is required, the certification process usually 
involves a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court that endorses the constitution as 
respecting the principles and values outlined in the central-state constitution. Sometimes the 
responsibility falls on a central-state executive body, such as in Bougainville (PNG), Sudan or 
South Sudan. However, its lack of independence can delegitimize the certification process 
and/or the draft to be certified.
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Table 4.1. Process design for substate constitution-making
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In Sudan, the National Ministry of Justice shall declare that substate constitutions are 
compatible with the Interim National Constitution and the Constitution of South Sudan 
(art. 2.12.12). In South Sudan, before independence, the certification process had two stages: 
first, the South Sudan Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development reviewed 
substate constitutions ‘for compatibility with the Interim Constitution of South 
Sudan’ (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1299–30); second, after the South Sudan Ministry 
approved the draft, it was sent to the national Ministry of Justice for certification. While the 
former ministry fairly quickly reviewed drafts for conformity with the Interim Constitution, 
the latter did not seem willing to follow suit: the South Sudan substate constitutions entered 
into force without final certification (2006: 1233–34). Apparently the rationale was that if 
the substate constitutions were compatible with the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, 
and the Interim Constitution of South Sudan was compatible with the Interim Constitution 
of Sudan, then this signified that the substate constitutions also conformed with the Interim 
Constitution of Sudan, and no further certification would be necessary (interview with Susan 
Stigant). Still, this was a departure from the pre-agreed certification process.
In Bougainville the situation might have been slightly different, in that the central-state 
constitution was amended to respond to the Bougainville Peace Agreement. Therein, it was 
mandated that ‘following adoption of the Bougainville Constitution, the Constituent 
Assembly shall transmit a copy of that Constitution to the National Executive 
Council’ (article 22(a)), and ‘upon being satisfied that the requirements of the National 
Constitution for the Bougainville Constitution have been met, the National Executive 
Council shall advise the head of State to endorse that Constitution’ (article 22(b)).
The South African Constitution’s section 144 is dedicated to the ‘Certification of 
provincial constitutions’, stating that ‘If a provincial legislature has passed or amended a 
constitution, the Speaker of the legislature must submit the text of the constitution or 
constitutional amendment to the Constitutional Court for certification’ (section 144(1)), 
and ‘No text of a provincial constitution or constitutional amendment becomes law until the 
Constitutional Court has certified: a. that the text has been passed in accordance with section 
142 [on the adoption of provincial constitutions]; and b. that the whole text complies with 
section 143 [on the contents of provincial constitutions]’ (section 144(2)). The premier of a 
province must then ‘assent to and sign the text of a provincial constitution or constitutional 
amendment that has been certified by the Constitutional Court’ (section 145(1)) before the 
constitution enters into force. The province of KwaZulu-Natal did not pass the certification 
process as the Constitutional Court identified many flaws, notably the usurpation of national 
powers (Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996, Case CCT 
15/96; Murray 2001). The other province that attempted to adopt a substate constitution—
Western Cape—while also struck down by the Constitutional Court in first instance, 
succeeded once it amended the draft following the Constitutional Court’s suggestions 
(Certification of the Constitution of Western Cape 1997, Case CCT 6/97).
In the Union of Comoros, the 2009 amendments to the 2001 Constitution require the 
Constitutional Court to certify the autonomous islands’ statutory laws in order for them to 
be promulgated (art. 7) (see Annex A for more details).
Ethiopia has no certification process, and the State Councils have the power ‘to enact and 
execute the state constitution and other laws’ (art. 52(2b)). Bosnia and Herzegovina has no 
certification process either, as the constitutions of the constitutive entities were enacted 
before the central-state constitution. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
Constitutional Court shall ‘at the request of the Prime Minister, of the canton concerned, or 
of one-third of the members of the Legislature of a Canton, determine whether any law or 
proposed law that has been adopted by that Legislature (including the Cantonal Constitution 
and any amendments thereto), is in accord with this Constitution’ (art. 10(2)(b)), as ‘the 
primary function of the Constitutional Court shall be to resolve disputes: (a) between any 
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Cantons; (b) between any Canton and the Federation Government’ (art. 10(1)). Indonesia 
also lacks a certification process, though the Constitutional Court ‘shall have the final power 
of decision in reviewing laws against the Constitution’ (art. 24C). It appears that the 
Constitutional Court only intervenes after a bill has become law, and hence only has a role in 
the ex-post review process. In Russia there seems to be no certification process for either its 
substate constitutions or charters. The constitution only states: ‘The following shall be within 
the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian 
Federation: a. measures to ensure the correspondence of constitutions and laws of republics, 
the charters, laws and other normative legal acts of krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, 
autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs to the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
and federal laws’ (art. 72(1)). The nature of this joint jurisdiction is not further defined in 
the constitution (Küpper 2013: 259). Somalia has no formal certification process, but the 
Constitutional Court (which has not been properly set up) has the power to invalidate any 
law or administrative action that may be contrary to the Constitution (art. 4(2)) or to ‘resolve 
any disputes between the Federal Government and the Federal Member State governments, 
or among the Federal Member State governments’ (art. 109C(1d)).
Post-adoption review of the substate constitution (in case of dispute)
In case of conflict, central-state constitutions prevail over substate constitutional frameworks 
(Burgess and Tarr 2012: 10; Saunders 2011: 874). While not all countries have (pre-
adoption) certification processes for substate constitutions, most countries have a 
Constitutional Court or Supreme Court in charge of upholding the central-state constitution 
if there is a dispute with (or between) ratified substate constitutions (see Table 4.1). 
Depending on whether the dispute arises between substate entities or between one or more 
substate entities and the central state, the stakeholders allowed to bring the case to court vary 
and can range from regular citizens to the governor (or equivalent) in the substate entity or 
the president/prime minister in the central-state executive. There are often informal (non-
court) ways of resolving intergovernmental disputes that are favoured in the central-state 
constitution before bringing the case to the courts.
The independence of a constitutional or supreme court is critical to the legitimacy of its 
rulings. These institutions are often independent on paper but not in practice, which can 
directly affect the legitimacy of constitutional frameworks and call the constitutional/
supreme court’s rulings into question. However, the substate entity/entities might be 
represented in the constitutional/supreme court, thereby enhancing the latter’s legitimacy. 
This is the case in the Union of Comoros, where ‘The President of the Union, the Vice 
Presidents of the Union, the President of the Assembly of the Union, and the heads of the 
islands executives shall each appoint one member to the Constitutional Court’ (art. 37 of the 
Constitution of Comoros (2001(2009)). Both the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(art. VI (1a)) and the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (art. 9) 
specifically provide for representation of their constituent entities or people, although as part 
of a more general logic of ethnic proportionality that excludes other societal group—see the 
judgements of the European Court of Human Rights in Sejdić  v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(no. 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009) and Zornic ́  v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (no. 3681/06, 14 July 2014).
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Timing and timelines are an important but often neglected issue in substate constitution-
building processes. Central-state constitutions are unlikely to mention timelines or deadlines 
for producing a substate constitution, though sometimes peace agreements do. When 
realistic, timelines can provide structure to the post-conflict constitution-building process, 
including at the substate level.
For example, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement stipulated a timeline, stating: ‘A new 
Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into force as soon as 
possible and not later than 31 March 2006’ (art. 1.1.1). The law, however, was only 
promulgated in August 2006 (May 2008). In Sudan, the Implementation Modalities of the 
Machakos and the Power Sharing Protocols (Naivasha, Kenya, 31 December 2004) require 
the state legislatures to draft and adopt state constitutions within three weeks of establishing 
the state legislature in northern states, and within four weeks after signing the South Sudan 
Constitution. Within two weeks of receiving the state constitutions, the National Ministry of 
Justice shall determine their compatibility with the Interim National Constitution in the case 
of northern states, and for South Sudan according to both the Interim National Constitution 
and the South Sudan Constitution (art. 2.12.12 of the 2004 Protocol on Power-sharing). 
These tight timelines were not met in either the north or south (Murray and Maywald 2006: 
1212). The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina establishes that the constitutive entities 
must amend their (pre-existing) constitutions within three months of the entry into force of 
the central-state constitution (November 2005) (art. 12, par. 2). However, the first post-
Dayton amendment of the constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
adopted only in June 2006, and the first amendment of the Constitution of the Republika 
Srpska was only adopted in April 2006.
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Inclusion in constitutional-space negotiations and drafting substate 
constitutions
Regarding levels of inclusion in the substate constitution-making process—defined here as 
the level of public participation and representation of main societal groups—there is a need 
to distinguish between the establishment of constitutional space and the drafting of the 
substate constitution. The allocation of constitutional space may be negotiated as part of a 
broader political settlement process between stakeholders representing both the central-state 
and the substate entity/entities, as happened in Bougainville (PNG) and Aceh (Indonesia), to 
a certain extent. Alternatively, constitutional space may be imposed from the centre with no 
or little substate participation, as occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, South 
Sudan, and Sudan to a certain extent.
When the constitutional space is the result of negotiations during a political settlement 
process, the level of societal and political inclusion can still vary greatly. For example, 
substate elites may dominate the process (and sometimes legitimately represent the 
population’s diversity). In Aceh (Indonesia), the agreement was signed by the Government of 
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, which the UCDP Database describes as a ‘rebel 
group’. Alternatively, substate negotiators and/or elites might formally (and legitimately) 
represent societal and political diversity. In Bougainville (PNG), the negotiations were led by 
the Government of PNG and ‘leaders representing the people of Bougainville’. The 
majority’s perception of the legitimacy of the negotiators is likely to influence acceptance of 
the constitutional space granted to the substate entity, and as a result the substate 
constitution.
Once the substate constitutional drafting starts, it is usually understood that there needs to 
be a certain level of local input into how to structure the substate authority and power 
therein (Marshfield 2011: 1163). Theoretically at least, the process of substate constitution-
building should facilitate public deliberation as decentralization decreases the jurisdiction size 
and citizens can more meaningfully engage in discussions (Marshfield 2011: 1187–88). 
However, this likely depends on the extent to which the constituent authority of the substate 
entity (a) is empowered by central and substate authorities to participate and (b) 
differentiates itself in significant ways from the constituent authority of the central state—
often in terms of ethnicity and/or religious belief (Saunders 2011: 874).
In most substate constitution-building processes in fragile and conflict-affected settings, it 
is difficult to gauge the extent to which public participation at the substate level played a 
significant role. Most often than not, public participation is not mandated by either the 
central-state constitution or any other arrangement, such as an interim constitution or peace 
agreement. In Sudan, for instance, it is not even clear ‘to what extent the assemblies complied 
with the legislative procedure for considering and amending the drafts, how much debate 
there was, or whether contributions were sought or allowed from members of the public and 
civil society groups’ (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1229). In Ethiopia, according to Regassa 
(2009: 52), public participation and political debate was not part of the drafting, deliberation 
or adoption phases for substate constitutions. Bougainville might be the only example where 
the peace agreement (art. 17) specifically states that the Constitutional Commission shall be 
representative in terms of the population of Bougainville, though it makes no reference to 
public participation either. In Indonesia, however, a large public consultation process 
affected both the clarity and consistency of the law, and led to ‘a rather complex and 
voluminous draft’ (May 2008: 42).
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The role of the international community
The international community’s role in substate constitution-building processes crucially 
depends not only on the needs of the substate entity, but also on the needs (and the demand) 
of central-state institutions. Especially where central-state institutions have been eroded after 
protracted violent conflict, as in Somalia, and/or where the international community has 
been engaged in brokering or guaranteeing peace agreements between the central state and 
the substate entity, as in Bougainville (PNG) (or even the central-state constitution-building 
process as in Iraq or Bosnia and Herzegovina), the international community might have a 
more significant role with regard to the substate(s) constitution-building processes.
The international community can (and has) engaged with these processes in a number of 
ways in the past, all of which usually have the express agreement of the central-state 
government, including: 
1. expert advisory services to key stakeholders, at both the central and substate levels, on 
specific process- or design-related issues, including interpreting the constitutional 
space granted to the substate entity in the central-state constitution;
2. guaranteeing the implementation of agreements between the central state and the 
substate entities, and mediating between stakeholders where necessary;
3. assistance (financial or any other type) in organizing relevant workshops/roundtables, 
sometimes extending to broader public fora or civic education campaigns at the 
substate level; and
4. capacity building of substate institutions and key stakeholders involved in the 
constitution-building process, for instance trainings, secondment and/or direct 
funding of staff, or procurement of other types of resources (including the 
organization of donor conferences).
The impact of international engagement varies depending on the context. The case of 
Somalia stands out, as the constituent units envisioned in its 2012 Provisional Constitution
—the Federal Member States (FMS)—had not yet been created when the constitution was 
adopted. Only the creation of the FMS would allow for the full implementation of the 
Provisional Constitution, including the establishment of the Upper House of the Federal 
Parliament, comprised of representatives of the FMS, with an active role in legislative affairs 
as well the appointment of key institutions. However, first the Boundaries and Federation 
Commission must recommend the number and boundaries of FMS (art. 49). The fact that 
the House of the People took until July 2015 to nominate the commission paved the way for 
the transitional government to work directly with regional stakeholders in forming the FMS. 
While lukewarm at first, the international community has increasingly engaged in both the 
FMS formation and constitution-building processes. By supporting these processes the 
international community might have been helping the Somali Government bypass the 
constitution, yet it also supported the state-building process at both the central and substate 
levels.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community had the opposite effect. Its two 
component entities both had substate constitutions previous to the signing of the 1995 
Dayton Agreement. The Constitution of the Republicka Srpska was adopted in February 
1992, before the start of the Bosnian War, ‘in a clear act of secession’ (Woelk 2012: 110). 
The Federation was created after the March 1994 Washington Agreement, which halted the 
conflict between Croats and Bosniacs, and led to the adoption of this entity’s constitution in 
June 1994. Both constitutions had to be fundamentally amended after the internationally 
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brokered Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, art. 
11), which reduced the constitutional space both entities had carved out for themselves. 
Central-state institutions have remained weak with regard to substate constitutional 
arrangements (Woelk 2012: 113). Using the 1997-conferred ‘Bonn Powers’ that allowed the 
UN High Representative to unilaterally legislate and dismiss obstructive public officials 
(Woelk 2012: 119), the international community attempted to centralize (and strengthen) 
the political system in order to bypass or counteract (nationalist) spoilers from both entities 
(Tzifakis 2007). The Venice Commission (2005) called for constitutional reform to transfer 
competencies from the entities to the state, and to clarify the entities’ future relationship to 
the state (Woelk 2012: 125). A constitutional amendment process has not yet occurred.
PNG is a formerly unitary (though devolved) state that, after 10 years of intra-state war 
(1988–98) between the armed forces of PNG and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (a 
secessionist armed group), agreed to grant (asymmetric) autonomy to Bougainville. The 2001 
Bougainville Peace Agreement included the framework of the Bougainville constitution-
building process, which was adopted in 2004, as well as the mandate to hold a referendum 
on Bougainville’s future political status within 10–15 years of electing the first Bougainville 
autonomous government (clauses 309–24) (UN 2001). The international community played 
a significant role in guaranteeing a peaceful environment for the ensuing constitution-
building and implementation processes. International intervention in the constitution-
building process itself was minor (Wallis 2016: 371), though it was agreed that the 
constitution had to meet international standards of good governance (Wallis 2016: 372). 
Regarding the content of the peace agreement, however, the government of PNG ‘was under 
considerable international pressures to settle the conflict for purposes of regional 
stability’ (Ghai and Regan 2006: 598), which meant making significant concessions 
regarding the immediate and future political status of Bougainville. Bougainvilleans only 
accepted a delay to the referendum on the future political status of Bougainville under 
pressure from the international community, which argued that this was the only way the 
central-state government would agree to a constitutionally guaranteed referendum (Ghai and 
Regan 2006: 599–600).
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6. Substate constitutional design
This section describes substate constitutional arrangements and compares the following 
aspects to the corresponding arrangements at the central-state level (and where relevant, other 
substate entities): system of government: parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential (see 
Elgie 2011; Shugart and Carey 1992); unicameral or bicameral legislatures; procedures for 
constitutional amendment (particularly the relative flexibility and rigidity between central 
and substate levels); regulation of local government; provision of group minority rights and 
substate symbols.
Systems of government
In many of the case studies, the design of executives at the substate level closely resembles the 
central-state design. Although there are differing levels of variation at the substate level, the 
basic model tends to remain the same. Sometimes, however, this variation can be significant, 
as illustrated in Russia and Somalia. The clear exception is PNG, where the central state and 
the substate entity opted for opposing models. There are theoretical cases for both 
approaches. Similarity allows for ‘user-friendly’ movement across both levels of government, 
both for political actors and interests. Variation, however, might allow some 
experimentation, and in some cases might better fit the political circumstances of the substate 
entity.
In Ethiopia (Amhara) and South Africa (Western Cape) the design of the parliamentary 
executive is virtually the same as the central-state system. In Indonesia, the central state is 
headed by the president, whereas Aceh and Papua are headed by governors, but they are both 
essentially presidential systems headed by a directly elected chief executive. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, again there is substantial resemblance between the central-state and substate 
constitutions, for example both adopted collegiate presidencies. In the central state, the 
presidency comprises three elected representatives of the Bosniac, Croat and Serb 
communities, with the chair rotating among the three during the term of the presidency. In 
the Federation, the president and two vice presidents must represent the three constituent 
peoples. While Republika Srpska is more orthodox in its semi-presidential form, all three 
designs are semi-presidential in nature, with the chief executives being separately and directly 
elected and the ministers being accountable to the legislature. In Russia, the semi-presidential 
system of the central state is replicated in Dagestan, whereas in Chechnya the legislature 
indirectly elects the head of the executive. However, other design features of the Chechen 
system closely resemble both Russia and Dagestan (e.g. the way the cabinet is constituted, its 
powers and functions, and in both substates candidates for chief executive are nominated by 
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the Russian president). The clear exception is PNG (parliamentary executive) and 
Bougainville (semi-presidential system), where the central state and the substate entity opt for 
opposing and very different models. Similarly, in Somalia, Puntland follows the central state 
in opting for a parliamentary executive, whereas Jubaland adopted a semi-presidential model. 
The diversity of models in this case appears to be a consequence of the country’s unique 
state-formation process, where the central state is weak and does not control all its territory; 
substate constitution-building, where possible, is in part aimed at building the capacity and 
legitimacy of the central state from below.
In all the federations except for Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Brčko District is a smaller 
and special substate entity which has a unicameral legislature), the central-state legislature is 
bicameral, whereas the substate legislatures are unicameral. This seems to follow the pattern 
that federal states usually have second chambers as houses of territorial representation for 
their regions, whereas the legislatures of substate entities within federal states do not need to 
perform this function. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, two factors clearly influence bicameralism 
at the substate level: the Federation has a further level of cantonal devolution that requires 
representation, and bicameralism at all levels is part of an elaborate and complex system of 
consociational power sharing (with the overall aim of equal representation of all three ethnic 
communities at all levels). In the unitary states, PNG and Bougainville are both unicameral, 
and in Indonesia the central-state legislature and those of Aceh and Papua are bicameral. 
However, in Indonesia, the second chambers are all relatively weak consultative bodies—even 
though they are directly elected and have specified jurisdictions—rather than checking 
mechanisms as in conventional understandings of bicameralism.
For more information on systems of government in central and substate constitutions, see 
Table 6.1. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are seldom listed as semi-presidential, possibly due to their unique collegiate presidencies, for 
the purposes of this paper both cases satisfy the definition of semi-presidentialism. They both 
have presidents with substantive executive powers who are elected directly and separately 
from their legislatures, and who govern with a cabinet that is collectively accountable to the 
legislature.
Table 6.1. Systems of government in federal and unitary states
Central state / 
substate entity





Semi-presidential republic Directly elected consociational rotating presidency 
and Council of Ministers responsible to legislature
Bicameral
Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
Semi-presidential system Directly elected consociational rotating presidency 
and Council of Ministers responsible to legislature
Bicameral
Republika Srpska Semi-presidential system Directly elected president and cabinet of ministers Bicameral
Brčko District Parliamentary system Mayor elected by the district assembly Unicameral
Comoros Anjouan substate constitution not available online
Ethiopia Parliamentary republic Government headed by prime minister formed by 
party with majority in legislature
Bicameral
Amhara Parliamentary system Government formed by party with majority in 
legislature
Unicameral
Russia Semi-presidential republic Directly elected president appoints prime minister 
and cabinet and is accountable to legislature
Bicameral
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Central state / 
substate entity
System of government Brief explanation Bicameral/
unicameral
Chechnya Parliamentary system 
(Russian president 
nominates head of 
republic)
Head of republic elected by legislature Unicameral
Dagestan Presidential system 
(Russian president 
nominates head of the 
executive)
Directly elected head of republic is chief executive 
and governs without parliamentary executive
Unicameral
Somalia Parliamentary republic Indirectly elected president is head of state, and 
indirectly elected prime minister is head of 
government
Bicameral
Puntland Parliamentary system Indirectly elected prime minister Unicameral
Jubaland Semi-presidential system President is elected separately from legislature 
(although indirectly by a ‘Delegates Conference’ 
rather than directly by the people), and cabinet is 
accountable to legislature
Unicameral
South Africa Parliamentary republic Hybrid system in which president combines head of 
state and head of government functions, and is 
indirectly elected by parliament
Bicameral
Western Cape Parliamentary system Prime minister indirectly elected by provincial 
legislature
Unicameral
South Sudan No substate constitutions available online
Sudan No substate constitutions available online
Unitary states





Aceh Presidential-type system Directly elected governor Bicameral 
(weak second 
chamber)
Papua Presidential-type system Directly elected governor Bicameral 
(weak second 
chamber)
PNG Parliamentary monarchy Queen represented by governor general as head of 
state; head of government is indirectly elected 
prime minister
Unicameral
Bougainville Semi-presidential system Directly elected president as head of Executive 
Council, composed of members of legislature
Unicameral
Procedures for constitutional amendment
Both central and substate constitutions in all cases analysed in this paper are more difficult to 
amend or replace than ordinary laws, but amendment procedures also vary depending on the 
country and its legal tradition. While assessing the flexibility of constitutions is difficult, 
Table 6.2 evaluates constitutions’ relative rigidity based on the fact that all central-state 
constitutions are more difficult to amend than substate constitutions. Other than for 
Bougainville, there is no requirement of express substate consent in amendments to central-
state constitutions even where those amendments affect the substate constitutional space. In 
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in many cases, however, there is provision for airing substate views within the central-state 
constitutional amendment process (e.g. through regional views represented in second 
chambers).
The right or power to initiate constitutional amendments is important in two ways. First, 
it illustrates the relationship between executives and legislatures. In practice, the right to 
initiate amendments is widely shared between executives and legislatures. However in some 
cases such as Russia, the executive has the leading role in initiating amendments, yet in this 
case the power is shared with the legislature and the substate entities. In other countries the 
legislature has the predominant role, for example in Indonesia. The second way in which this 
power is important is that it sheds light on the relationship between the central and substate 
levels. No amendment of any central-state constitution except Russia may be initiated by 
substate entities. In some cases extensive consultation is required for central-state 
constitutional amendment (e.g. in PNG for amendments related to powers devolved to 
Bougainville). Elsewhere, provincial representation in the lower chamber allows substate 
views to be heard in initiation proceedings, as in South Africa and Indonesia. Similarly, most 
substate entities do not recognize a right of central-state institutions to initiate amendments 
to substate constitutions, except in Amhara, where changes to founding principles and 
fundamental rights engage a procedure in the Ethiopian Constitution that involves the 
central as well as all substate legislatures. Since the substate constitutions of Aceh and Papua 
are provided by Indonesian law, only central institutions can amend them. In PNG and 
Bougainville, detailed consultation requirements mean that both levels share the power to 
initiate amendments.
Another important aspect in the relationship between the central and substate levels is the 
requirement for consultation and consent of levels of government other than the one seeking 
change. All but two of the federations in the current sample require some form of 
consultation. and very often the legislative consent of their substate entities is needed to 
amend their central-state constitutions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, rigidity in this regard is 
provided through the elaborate consociational requirements of cross-communal consensus 
built into its procedure of constitutional amendment. In South Africa, substate views are 
represented through the central second chamber (comprised of provincial representatives) 
rather than the substate institutions. In unitary states, the picture is more mixed. Indonesia 
does not give any substate institutions a role in amending its constitution, but the bicameral 
central legislature sits in joint session when considering constitutional amendments, and the 
second chamber, though otherwise quite weak, has an opportunity to represent regional 
views in the proceedings. In PNG, there is no requirement unless the amendment concerns 
Bougainville, in which case substate consent is required to change the central-state 
constitution.
Most substate constitutions in federal states do not include a role for the consultation or 
consent of central-state institutions in their amendment procedures, except in Amhara under 
the same framework as for initiation (discussed above). Amendments to any substate 
constitution in South Africa require certification by the Constitutional Court for consistency 
with the central-state constitution (see Table 4.1). In unitary states, Bougainville is merely 
required to inform the central-state executive of substate constitutional amendments.
As for the rules of procedure for constitutional amendments, there is the widest possible 
range, including enhanced legislative majorities, parallel majorities, consociational consensus, 
parliamentary special procedures including joint or separate sessions of bicameral legislatures, 
temporal restraints (e.g. with specific timelines to slow down the process), referendums and 
even provision for Constituent Assemblies (see also Dixon and Holden 2011). Except for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ethiopia, central-state constitutions are more rigid than 
substate constitutions (Ginsburg and Posner 2010). Some constitutions contain ‘eternity 
clauses’ that expressly prohibit any amendment of particular types of provisions (Klein and 
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Sajó 2012), mostly fundamental/human rights, founding principles and amendment 
procedures. Even though such clauses are significant in post-conflict settings (Suteu 2017), 
constitution-makers often use them sparingly because they cannot be legally amended. In the 
present sample, only the constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Comoros, Somalia, Indonesia and to some extent Russia include them. 
Indonesia is the only country that protects its unitary statehood through an eternity clause. 
The 2001 and (amended) 2009 versions of the Constitution of the Union of Comoros both 
include an eternity clause to protect the integrity of the federal union as well as the autonomy 
of the substate entities.

















High President in agreement with the vice 
presidents, the government, a majority 
in the lower house, and a majority of 
delegates from each of the three 
communities in the upper house
A simple majority of delegates of each of the three 
communities in the upper house, and a two-thirds 
majority in the lower house.
No central state role
Republika 
Srpska
High The president of the republic, the 
government or at least 30 deputies of 
the lower house
Two-thirds majority of the lower house and a 
majority of each constituent people in the upper 
house.
No central state role
Brčko District High (unclear) Three-fourths of the total number of elected 
Councillors of the District Assembly, and at least 
one-third of Councillors from each constituent 
people present and voting.
Comoros Anjouan substate constitution not available online
Ethiopia High Unclear but according to conventions of 
parliamentarism, likely initiated in 
lower house by government (majority 
party)
Two types of procedures depending on specific 
issues: (1) two-thirds majority in each legislative 
chamber, plus the approval by simple majority of all 
substate legislature; (2) two-thirds majority of the 
two legislative chambers in joint session, plus the 
approval by simple majority of two-thirds of the 
substate legislatures.
Substate legislative consent required
Amhara High One-third of the members of the 
legislature; or majority vote of the 
members of the Council of the Regional 
Government; or majority vote of the 
members of one of the Nationality 
Councils within the substate entity; or 
one-third of all the ‘Woreda Councils’ 
within the substate entity; or one-third 
of all ‘Kebele Councils’ within the 
substate entity
Depending on the specific provisions to be 
amended: (1) following article 105 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution, i.e. two-thirds majority of the two 
legislative chambers in joint session, plus the 
approval by simple majority of two-thirds of the 
substate legislatures; (2) more than half of all 
‘Woreda Councils’, two-thirds of the members of 
one of the Nationality Councils, and three-fourths of 
the members of the legislature; (3) for provisions to 
do with amendment rules: two-thirds majority of the 
members of two-thirds of all ‘Woreda Councils’, two-
thirds majority of the members of two-thirds of the 
Nationality Councils, and three-fourths of the 
members of the legislature.
Some provisions amendable only 
through procedure in central-state 
constitution, which involves central-
state and other substate institutions
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Institution that initiates amendment Amendment rules
Russia High The president, upper house, lower 
house, government, substate 
legislative representatives, or groups of 
not less than one-fifth of the members 
of the upper or lower house
Depending on the specific chapters of the 
constitution to be amended: (1) call of a Constituent 
Assembly (supported by three-fifths of all members 
of the lower and upper houses), approval by two-
thirds of the total number of its members or call for 
referendum; (2) three-quarters in the upper house, 
two-thirds in the lower house, and simple majority 
in at least two-thirds of the substate legislatures; (3) 
(regarding adding or changing the boundaries of 
substate entities) three-quarters in the upper 
house, and two-thirds in the lower house.
Substate legislative consent required
Chechnya Low President of the Chechen Republic or 
the legislature
Two-thirds majority of the substate legislature; if the 
head of the republic rejects the amendment, a 
three-fourths majority of the legislature can override 
this vote.No formal central state role
Dagestan Medium President of Dagestan, the legislature, 
the government, or a group of deputies 
of the legislature who represent not 
less than one-third of the total number 
of deputies of the legislature
Two types of procedures: (1) Call of a Constituent 
Assembly and a referendum; (2) Two-thirds majority 
of the substate legislature.
No formal central state role
Somalia High Lower house Amendable provisions require two-thirds majority in 
both legislative chambers and a referendum.
No substate role
Puntland Medium One-fifth of the substate legislature, or 
the government of the substate entity, 
or 5,000 voters
Two successive three-fourths majorities in the 
substate legislature with a one-month interval 
between the votes.
No central-state role
Jubaland Low Two-thirds majority in the substate 
legislature
Three-fourths majority in the substate legislature.
No central state role
South Africa High National Assembly (lower house), with 
the possibility of the upper house to 
participate
Depending on the specific section/chapter of the 
constitution to be amended: (1) three-fourths in the 
lower house, and the support of at least six 
provinces in the National Council of the Provinces; 
(2) two-thirds in the lower house, and the support of 
at least six provinces in the National Council of the 
Provinces.
No substate institutional role except for 
National Council of the Provinces 
involvement in central processes
Western Cape Low Provincial legislature Two-thirds majority in the substate legislature.
No central state role except 
requirement that Constitutional Court 
certify all substate constitutional 
amendments
South Sudan No substate constitutions available online
Sudan No substate constitutions available online
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Indonesia High One-third of the members of 
the MPR (or joint sitting of the 
lower and upper houses)
Simple majority in a joint sitting of the lower and upper 
houses, albeit with enhanced attendance requirements 
(at least two-thirds of the total membership). Provisions 
relating to the form of the unitary state may not be 
amended (art. 37 (5)).No substate role, except limited 
role of upper house in 
representing provincial 
interests
Aceh Low Both chambers of the provincial 
legislature, or the central lower 
house in consultation with the 
Aceh lower house
The Law on Governing Aceh (11/2006) stipulates only 
central-state institutions can amend (always in 
consultation with the Aceh legislature), while the Qanun, 
related to the implementation of this law, can be 
amended by Aceh’s two legislative chambers.
Dominant central-state role
Papua Low Both chambers of the provincial 
legislature
(As all other laws), majority of the central lower house in 
joint approval with the president of Indonesia.
Central-state plays dominant 
role
PNG High Unclear but according to 
conventions of 
parliamentarism, likely 
initiated in lower house by 
government (majority party)
Depending on the provision: (1) absolute majority; (2) 
three-quarters majority; or (3) two-thirds majority in the 
legislature (default); when affecting Bougainville, with 
significant requirements to consult and coordinate with 
local stakeholders, and with the additional either two-
thirds absolute majority vote of members of the 
Bougainville legislature or a simple majority of the 
members of the Bougainville legislature.
Extensive consultation with 
substate level if amendment 
affects Bougainville
Bougainville Low National or Bougainville 
Government (in consultation)
Absolute majority vote of the Bougainville legislature (art. 
195 (4)), while informing the PNG minister in charge of 
Bougainville affairs (art. 287 of PNG Constitution).
Minor role for central state
Note: This paper defines the level of rigidity of substate constitutions relative to that of the central-state 
constitution, which is considered to be ‘high’ by default, as it is the supreme law of the land and is understood to 
be more difficult to amend than ordinary law. The ‘medium’ and ‘low’ categories are meant to distinguish the 
level of rigidity between different substate constitutions within the same country. If there is only one substate 
constitution available, and its amendment rules are less rigid (or more flexible) than those of the central-state 
constitution, these are automatically deemed ‘low’ rigidity. When there are two or more substate constitutions 
with different (and more or less rigid/flexible) amendment rules, constitutions that are easier to amend are 
classified as ‘low’. Those that are ‘in between’ the central-state constitution and the easiest-to-amend substate 
constitution in terms of rigidity are classified as ‘medium’. These classifications are not meant to be exact; they are 
intended to give a sense of the degree of rigidity/flexibility of each constitution.
Who deals with local government?
Both central-state and substate constitutions in the case studies permit some form of local 
government, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which only makes special 
arrangements for the Brčko District. This district was established after the Dayton 
Agreement and currently functions according to the 2008 Statute of the Brčko District of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (see also Gavrić, Banovic ́  and Barreiro 2013: 23). Such special 
arrangements are also granted in the substate constitutions of Amhara and Bougainville. 
Somalia’s Constitution contemplates a local government level, but makes no further 
provision. The 2009 amendments of the 2001 Comoros Constitution state that the 
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autonomous islands can deal with the administration of local communities, but no further 
details are provided. Ethiopia and PNG establish the principle of local government 
autonomy, and the central-state constitution provides a basic framework for their 
organization and functions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros and Somalia, therefore, 
the design and operation of local government is a matter solely for the substate entities. In 
Ethiopia, the central-state constitution sets down the essential principles and structure of 
local bodies, but further operationalization is devolved to the substate entities (although in 
practice the central government seems to play a more interventionist role). The situation is 
the same in PNG in relation to Bougainville, although in other regions of PNG the central 
state has a more direct relationship with local governments.
At the other end of the spectrum, the arrangements for local government are highly 
developed in the central-state constitutions of South Africa, Russia and Indonesia, albeit in 
different ways. Local government in South Africa is anchored in the concept of ‘cooperative 
government’, a cornerstone of the constitution that recognizes the national, provincial and 
local spheres in a three-tier structure of government. The constitution elaborates the 
principles on which the three spheres govern in cooperation with each other, and details the 
powers, functions, composition and structure of the local sphere. The Russian Constitution 
goes into less institutional detail with regard to local government, but echoes the South 
African approach in setting out a well-developed conceptual framework for this level. The 
Russian Constitution recognizes and guarantees the concept of ‘local self-government’ and its 
distinctiveness from the institutions of substate government. The constitution describes the 
organizing principles of local self-government, but leaves its specific form open for local 
communities to decide, while guaranteeing local government independence from the substate 
entities. The Indonesian Constitution divides the country’s territory into provinces, and the 
provinces into regencies and municipalities. The constitution also sets out the basic structure 
of each of these administrative units, which emulate the executive and legislative design of 
the central state, but leaves the detail to legislation. This is common practice, as most 
constitutions (both central- and substate) establish the main principles, and leave the details 
to be regulated by law.
The Russian and Indonesian constitutions also provide for direct institutional links 
(including through fiscal and financial relationships) between the central state and the local 
government, which can bypass the substate level. The three-tier system in South Africa also 
necessitates a direct relationship between the central state and local governments, but that 
system protects substate autonomy in the relationship between substate entities and local 
governments.
These characteristics of central-state constitutions are also found in substate constitutions. 
Jubaland’s constitution is the least detailed, as it only recognizes that local government bodies 
may exist; it defers everything else to future legislation. The substate constitutions of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, Bougainville, Chechnya and 
Dagestan all contain some detail, but delay further provisions to legislation. Within this 
group of substate constitutions, Bougainville has the most distinctive arrangements compared 
to the central-state constitution, whereas the provisions in Chechnya and Dagestan are close 
replications of the Russian framework. Much more detail concerning local government is 
found in Western Cape and Puntland (although again, further substate legislation is 
contemplated), and the special autonomy laws for Aceh and Papua, which are very similar in 
this respect, are the most elaborately detailed in regards to local government. This elaborate 
detail is a function of the structure of even special substate autonomy being closely 
intermeshed with the unitary structure of the Indonesian Constitution.
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Group minority rights
Other than their territorial systems of autonomy, the majority of the central and substate 
constitutions analysed here provide for special regimes of enforceable group rights to protect 
minorities. Rights provisions of this type may mutually reinforce each other (i.e. between 
central and substate constitutions), or substitute for each other.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Russia and South Africa have central-state 
constitutions that include specific minority rights. The substate constitutions of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, the Brčko District and Amhara 
also provide such frameworks. Those that do not are PNG, Somalia and Indonesia, although 
certain Indonesian provisions recognize traditional communities’ customary and cultural 
rights, as well as the state’s duty to respect and preserve local languages as ‘national cultural 
treasures’. Of Indonesia’s substate entities, Papua’s special autonomy law makes no reference 
to minority rights; nor does Aceh’s law, although it refers to indigenous traditions, customs 
and leaderships and their protection, not all of which are necessarily ‘minority’ rights, but 
relate to the majority substate population.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Africa, provide the clearest constitutional protections 
of minority rights. Their past conflicts and post-conflict transitions demanded such 
protections, and the settlement processes drew heavily on the international human rights 
discourse. The consociational constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina fundamentally deals 
with group rights. In addition to its elaborate provisions for the three constituent peoples and 
entities, it also includes group minority rights by incorporating or acceding to a series of 
international human rights instruments in the domestic legal system, including the European 
Convention of Human Rights, which has supremacy over domestic law, and a number of 
other international treaties that concern minority rights, including the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1994). All of these legal protections are binding on the 
substate entities as well. The Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution guarantees the 
collective rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities, empowers parliament to 
adopt charters of rights to ‘deepen the culture of democracy’, and the judicial certification 
process ensures that substate constitutions protect these rights. Moreover, the constitution 
permits the adoption of national legislation recognizing the right of self-determination of any 
territorially based community that shares a common cultural and linguistic heritage, but only 
within the framework of self-determination of the South African people as a whole. Likewise, 
one of the distinguishing features of the Ethiopian Constitution is the collective rights it 
confers on internal ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’. These groups are given the rights to 
develop language, express culture and preserve history, to establish territorial institutions of 
self-government, and (together with the substate entities), the ‘unconditional’ right to self-
determination, including secession.
While it is very unusual for the protection of group minority rights to extend to groups 
within substate entities being given the right to their own constitution, either by the central 
or substate constitution, such a right is permitted in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s substate constitution. While the cantons may have their own constitutions, the 
Federation Constitution provides considerable binding detail about the cantonal structures of 
government and requires that any cantonal constitution is consistent with the Federation 
Constitution (see Annex A for further details).
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Symbols
Symbols are expressions of substate identity and distinctiveness, and many of the substate 
constitutions examined here provide for substate symbols that are different from those of the 
central state. The Western Cape Constitution makes provision for provincial symbols to be 
created by provincial legislation. The Dagestan constitution provides for its own state 
symbols, including a coat of arms, flag and anthem to be established by law. Amhara 
provides for its own flag, emblem and anthem to be instituted by law; the anthem is required 
to reflect the objectives of the constitution, the belief in living together with the rest of the 
peoples of Ethiopia and their common destiny. The Jubaland Constitution provides for its 
own flag, emblem and official seal, but does not mention an anthem. The Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina permits its own flag, anthem, coat of arms and seal, as well as other 
symbols to be determined by the legislature, but approval of symbols requires a majority vote 
in each house, including a majority of Bosniac and Croat delegates in the House of Peoples. 
The flag, coat of arms and anthem of the Republika Srpska is to be determined by law. 
Bougainville’s Constitution has one of the more elaborate provisions, seeking to institute 
symbols that are ‘of a character and kind unique to Bougainville’. It states that a Bougainville 
law shall provide for its flag, emblem, motto, seal, pledge, anthem, style of dress, awards, 
holidays and days of celebration. These substate constitutions therefore provide for their own 
symbols consistently with what is permitted under their central-state constitutions, but do 
not refer to a requirement for further central state approval.
The Aceh special autonomy law reaffirms the Indonesian national flag and anthem, but 
states that the Aceh government may adopt a regional flag, crest and hymn reflecting its 
special characteristics, by law. Yet the law states that the Aceh regional flag will not be treated 
as a symbol of Aceh sovereignty. The Papua special autonomy law is virtually identical in this 
respect.
The Constitution of Chechnya is silent on symbols, whereas the Puntland Constitution 
states that its emblem, flag and anthem are those of the Somali central state. Finally, the 
statute of the Brčko District is the sole case in the sample that stipulates that there shall be no 
flag or coat of arms for the district except those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its seal and 
oath affirms that it is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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7. Conclusion
This paper has explored conflict-affected countries in which substate constitutional 
frameworks have been used in a range of ways, from merely organizing substate entities after 
conflict to managing territorial claims for autonomy. While substate constitutionalism has 
received policy and scholarly attention in recent years, this analysis has focused on fragile and 
conflict-affected settings in which substate constitution-building raises distinctive and more 
difficult questions than in more stable and peaceful contexts with established traditions of 
constitutional government.
The paper has examined substate entities that are identifiable territorial units within 
countries, the people of which are perceived to be distinctive in terms of historic, ethnic or 
cultural identity. Whether the central-state constitutions are federal or unitary affects how 
the ‘constitutional space’ of the substate entities is understood. The substate constitutional 
space is usually provided for in the central-state constitution, but may also be defined in 
peace agreements and/or transitional political arrangements. This combination of legally 
formalized and more political agreements is critical to a full understanding of the scope and 
nature of substate constitutionalism in these conflict-affected settings. The sequencing of the 
broader political settlement process through which the substate constitutional space is created 
is also significant.
There are many reasons why substate constitutions are adopted. From the central-state 
perspective, giving a substate constitutional space may help manage conflict in communally 
plural polities with territorially concentrated groups, and may help improve political 
participation and representation. From the substate perspective, substate constitutions might 
give institutional shape to claims for self-government, enhance the legitimacy of these 
institutions, and/or provide government stability to conflict-affected settings. The case 
studies portray a mixed picture on the impact of substate constitution-building processes on 
conflict prevention/management.
Aside from these conceptual parameters of substate constitutionalism, this paper has 
analysed in great detail the process dimensions of substate constitution-building as well as the 
substantive content of substate constitutional design. With regard to process, it explored a 
series of critical issues including the extent to which the substate entity is permitted to design 
its own governing institutions; the institutions vested with the responsibility to draft and 
adopt the constitution; whether the constitution requires validation by central-state 
institutions (both judicial and political bodies, and if so, their independence and legitimacy 
from the substate perspective); and the mechanisms for dispute settlement in a multi-level 
system. As with any constitution-building process, issues of timing and inclusion are key 
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elements in the substate sphere; the analysis also examined the role of the international 
community, where the latter has been relevant.
The paper then turned to constitutional design, and explored how substate constitutions (in 
the context of the constitutional arrangements of their central states and other substate 
entities) give effect to systems of government (in particular, whether executives are 
parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential, and whether legislatures are unicameral or 
bicameral); procedures for constitutional amendment (in particular, the relative flexibility 
and rigidity between the central and substate levels); the regulation of local government; the 
provision of group minority rights; and substate symbols. The case studies revealed a rich 
diversity of institutional forms, in many cases reflecting unique aspects of the conflict and the 
circumstances of their settlement, and identifying some general patterns. Even in post-
conflict settings, where the provision of a distinctive substate constitutional space implies a 
relatively high degree of autonomy, the path dependency of pre-existing constitutional 
traditions is visible, especially in systems of government in which substate entities tend to 
emulate their central states in the design of their autonomous executives. By contrast, most 
substate legislatures tend to be unicameral even where the central legislature is bicameral. 
Moreover, all the federations studied here provide for some form of substate representation 
through a federal lower chamber, whereas this device is less significant in the unitary states.
Constitutional amendment procedures are generally less rigid at the substate level, in part 
because the bicameralism of most central legislatures is absent at the substate level. The 
constitutional provision for local governments below the substate level is often shared 
between the constitutions of the central-state and substate entities, with the latter (and 
subconstitutional legislation of both levels) providing further detail to the basic framework 
established by the former. Not all constitutions provide special regimes of group minority 
rights in addition to frameworks of substate autonomy, but where they do, they represent 
cases where international human rights law played a major role in the constitutional 
transitions. In some cases, the textual provision of rights in constitutions would need to be 
understood subject to other features of the political system, including strong (or even 
authoritarian) one-party or dominant-party politics as well as doctrines of constitutional 
practice such as the principle of democratic centralism. Most, if not all, of the examples of 
substate constitutions in the sample provide for distinctive regional symbols (flags, crests, 
anthems), but in some cases the constitutions stipulated that such symbols were not 
emblematic of a separate sovereignty.
The sample case studies are broadly comparable—territorially plural conflict-affected states 
that provide for separate substate constitutional frameworks. By comparing aspects of space, 
process and design across them, this paper has extracted general lessons from their experience 
that may be of use to other countries considering this option of constitutional conflict 
management. Notwithstanding varying degrees of success in implementation, which has not 
been the focus of this paper, it is clear that in the cases analysed here, the substate 
constitution-building process has been a necessary (though not sufficient) element of conflict 
management. 
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Annex A. Parameters for the substate 
institutional framework
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)
The Bougainville Peace Agreement of 30 August 2001 states that Bougainville (PNG) will 
have a constitution, and ‘the right to assume increasing control over a wide range of powers, 
functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in the National 
Constitution’ (art. 1). Article 11 of the Bougainville Constitution states that ‘the 
Bougainville Constitution will provide for the organisation and structures of the government 
for Bougainville under the autonomy arrangements (‘the autonomous Bougainville 
Government’) in a manner consistent with this Agreement’. The peace agreement calls for an 
elected and broadly representative legislature, an accountable executive body and an impartial 
judiciary (or to operate fully or partly under central-state courts) (art. 28–31). The 1975 
Constitution of PNG was amended in 2002 after the peace agreement was signed, and it 
includes a section on the Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum that 
expands the content of the peace agreement. This expansion likely occurred with the 
agreement of Bougainville stakeholders, and hence any limitation to the constitutional space 
that one might derive out of the sheer detail with regards to Bougainville governing 
structures would reflect consensus between the parties following the peace agreement and 
before the 2004 substate constitution.
Comoros
In Comoros, the island of Anjouan seceded in 1997 and drafted a constitution that was never 
recognized. After the 2001 Framework Agreement for Reconciliation in Comoros 
(Fomboni Agreement) Anjouan rejoined the Union. This agreement represented a political 
settlement through which the parties to the conflict decided to build a new Union of 
Comoros that would adequately divide power between the Union and the Islands to allow 
the latter to freely administer their own affairs and thereby promote their socio-economic 
development (art. 1 (ii)). The 2001 Constitution of Comoros furthermore states in article 7 
that ‘Each island shall freely establish its fundamental law while respecting the Constitution 
of the Union.’ However, in 2009 there were major revisions to the Comoros Constitution, 
authorized by referendum, which aimed to both scale back the size of government and 
rationalize the system of archipelagic autonomy by reorganizing the central state territory 
from the federal to the lowest (commune) level. Comoros remains a federal state with 
International IDEA   43
Annex A. Parameters for the substate institutional framework
autonomy for the islands, including elected institutions, but these are now better integrated 
into the central-state institutions. Constitutional changes in this regard include renaming the 
island’s ‘fundamental laws’ as ‘statutory laws’, and the increased specificity of the institutional 
make-up of the islands (effectively decreasing the constitutional space previously granted to 
the islands). A new article 7.2 details the executive and legislative powers in the autonomous 
islands: executive power will be exercised by an elected governor assisted by a maximum of 
six commissioners; governor elections shall use the two-round system, and there shall be a 
two-term limit; the legislature shall function in the form of a Council, elected through a 
majoritarian system in single-member constituencies for a five-year term.
Sudan
The Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement on Power Sharing (26 May 2004) establishes the basic structure of substate 
legislatures and executives (part IV) as well as the division of powers between the national, 
South Sudan and state governments (part V, schedules A–F). The protocol was then made 
part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (9 January 2005), which had a significant 
impact on the substance of substate constitutions in Sudan (and South Sudan), leaving little 
to be settled in either the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (6 July 
2005) or the substate constitutions (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1212). The 2005 Interim 
National Constitution of Sudan provides separately for the South Sudanese state institutions 
(part 11) and the substate institutions of North Sudan (part 12, art. 177–84). Regarding 
North Sudan, the Interim Constitution specifies the division of powers at the substate level 
by dealing separately with the state executive (art. 179), the state legislature (art. 180) and the 
state judiciary (art. 181). It furthermore defines the system of government as presidential, the 
legislature as unicameral, and the structure of the state as decentralized and composed of 
states (with no specific mention of federalism). The 4 January 2015 amendment to the 2005 
Interim Constitution curtailed the substates’ autonomy and allowed the president of Sudan 
to nominate their governors. It is unclear whether the substate entities have amended their 
constitutions accordingly, and to what extent the decline in autonomy has reduced the 
constitutional space of the Sudanese substate entities.
South Sudan
The 2005 pre-independence Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan  ‘expands on the 
powers and functions of the governments of the southern states [with respect to the Interim 
National Constitution], and includes sections on the structure and functions of the local 
government system in South Sudan as well as the role of traditional authority and customary 
law’ (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1218). It furthermore declares that the states should have 
legislative, executive and judicial organs (art. 168(1)). The institutional framework devised in 
the post-independence 2011 The institutional framework devised in the post-independence 
2011  Transition Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, however, diverges in key 
points from the Interim Constitution. For instance, it only mentions legislative and executive 
organs as substate institutions (art. 163), not judicial organs, and therefore discards any 
provision related to substate courts that the Interim Constitution might have provided for. 
Both constitutions, however, provide that the states will have a presidential system, with an 
elected governor subject to votes of no confidence, after which the governor would have to 
call for elections; if the governor wins a vote of no confidence, the legislature would need to 
be dissolved and newly elected within 60 days (art. 170(4) / art. 164(4)). In both 
constitutions, state ministers are individually and collectively answerable to both the 
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governor and the state Legislative Assembly in the performance of their functions (art. 
169(4) / art. 165(4)).
Two further differences between the constitutions relate to the fact that in the Transition 
Constitution the elected governor can appoint his or her Council of Ministers, deputy 
governor and state advisors in accordance with the constitution, but has to consult with the 
president (art. 165); the Interim Constitution did not include such a provision (art. 169). 
And while both constitutions provide for the state governor ‘to be elected by the residents of 
that state’ (art. 169(1) / art. 165(1)), in the Transition Constitution the functions of the 
president also include: ‘r. remove a state Governor and/or dissolve a state Legislative 
Assembly in the event of a crisis in the state that threatens national security and territorial 
integrity’ and ‘s. appoint a state care-taker Governor who shall prepare for elections within 
sixty days in the state where the Governor has been removed or the state Legislative Assembly 
so dissolved in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the relevant state 
constitution and the law’ (art. 101). General elections and elections for governors in South 
Sudan, however, have not been held since 2010. The president has also appointed governors 
for a rapidly increasing number of states: in the past three years the number of states has 
increased from 10 to 32 (Sudan Tribune 2015).
South Africa
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa allowed the provinces to adopt provincial 
constitutions under two conditions: (1) legislative and executive structures and procedures 
must be different from those provided in the central-state constitution and (2) the substate 
constitutions provide for a traditional monarch to have a role in the province (section 160). 
The Interim Constitution therefore establishes a Commission on Provincial Government 
(section 163) to ‘advise the Constitutional Assembly on the development of a constitutional 
dispensation with regard to provincial systems of government’ (section 164(1a)) and ‘advise 
the national government or a provincial government on the establishment and consolidation 
of administrative institutions and structures in a province (…)’ (section 164(1b)). Still 
sections 125–54 of the Interim Constitution provide an interim institutional framework for 
the provincial legislatures and executives in advance of the Commission on Provincial 
Government’s report. Sections 104–41 of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa detail the 
legislative and executive institutional structure to be enacted in South Africa’s provinces, and 
repeat almost verbatim the conditions laid out in the Interim Constitution for the provinces 
to adopt their own constitutions (section 143(1)).
In a second group of cases the central-state constitution (as well as any other previous 
arrangement or constitutional framework) gives few details on the institutional framework of 
the substate entities. This might mean that the constitutional space granted is broad, but it 
also leaves it up to the body in charge of certifying and/or ex post reviewing the constitutional 
text to decide whether or not the latter conforms to the central-state constitution. Examples 
include Ethiopia, Somalia, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Indonesia.
Ethiopia
The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia  (22 July 1991) marked the end of the 
intrastate war that lasted from 1976 to 1991. The Transitional Charter affirms ‘The right of 
nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination’ (art. 2) but does not specify how self-
determination will be structured. Article 13 states that ‘There shall be a law establishing local 
and regional councils for local administrative purposes defined on the basis of nationality. 
Elections for such local and regional councils shall be held within three months of the 
International IDEA   45
Annex A. Parameters for the substate institutional framework
establishment of the Transitional Government, wherever local conditions allow’, therefore 
creating an institution of crucial importance in the future constitution-building processes at 
the substate level. The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
in turn defines the federal structure of the state (art. 1), and establishes that the states shall 
have the power ‘To enact and execute the state constitution and other laws’ (art. 52(2b)). 
The central-state constitution, however, only gives two indications as to the content of 
substate constitutions: (1) they shall provide for legislative, executive and judicial powers at 
the substate level (art. 50(2)) and (2) the state administration should advance self-
government and a democratic order based on the rule of law (art. 52(2a)). The State 
Councils are therefore provided with enough space—at least in theory—to define their 
institutional framework as best fits their particular context.
Somalia
In Somalia, the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic stipulates that 
state governments will control the development of state constitutions (art. 12). It gives no 
further details on either the process or the structure of the institutional framework. The only 
constitutional framework agreed at the substate level was in Puntland, which adopted a 
transitional charter in 1998 with a three-year timeline to adopt a final constitution, which it 
did in 2001; Puntland adopted an updated version of its substate constitution on 18 April 
2012. In 2006 a constitutional review process started in Puntland, which ended with the 
adoption of a constitutional framework in June 2009. The process was internally led with no 
guidance from central-state institutions (Ahmed and Zamora 2010). The 2012 Provisional 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia requires the Federal Member States, once 
established, to adopt their own substate constitutional frameworks (art. 52(2)). It states—
offering no further detail—that ‘The establishment of the legislative and executive bodies of 
government of the Federal Member States is a matter for the Constitutions of the Federal 
Member States’ (art. 120). From August 2013 to July 2014 the federal government signed 
agreements with delegations of three of the five constitutive substate entities—Jubaland, 
South West State  and Galmudug—urging the latter to build interim administrations (in 
advance of the constitution-building processes). While the agreements with both the South 
West State and Galmudug delegations only establish the bodies and timeline to create an 
interim administration, the agreement with Jubaland provides some detail on the structure of 
this interim administration, and gives a two-year timeline for the constitution to be adopted 
and the permanent state structures to be established.
Russia
Likewise, Russia’s Constitution does not explicitly describe the institutional framework of its 
substate entities. It states in article 1(1) that ‘Russia is a democratic federative law-governed 
state with a republican form of government.’ In article 5 it continues by saying that ‘1. The 
Russian Federation shall consist of republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, an 
autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs, which shall have equal rights as constituent 
entities of the Russian Federation’ and ‘2. A republic (state) shall have its own constitution 
and legislation. A kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast and 
autonomous okrug shall have its own charter and legislation.’ The constitution does not 
further differentiate between substate ‘constitutions’ and substate ‘charters’. It only states in 
article 68(2) that ‘Republics shall have the right to establish their own State languages. In 
state government bodies, local self-government bodies and State institutions of republics they 
shall be used together with the State language of the Russian Federation.’ In article 70(1) it 
further establishes that ‘The system of government bodies of republics, krays, oblasts, cities of 
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federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs shall be established by the 
constituent entities of the Russian Federation independently in accordance with the basic 
principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and the general principles of 
the organisation of representative and executive State government bodies which are 
established by federal law.’ ‘The constitution is silent regarding the procedure for electing or 
appointing the heads of the executive organs of state power of the subjects of the 
federation’ (Domrin 2006: 235). The 1999 parliamentary act, ‘On the General Principles of 
the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Organs of State Power in the 
Subjects of the Russian Federation’, provides for the state legislatures to be elected under 
universal suffrage. The president, however, has had the power to appoint governors since 
2004 (see Küpper 2013: 256; Roth 2013). None of the (peace) agreements signed to end the 
first Chechen war (1994–96) included details on the institutional framework the Republic of 
Chechnya was to adopt. The December 1995 Agreement on the basic principles of 
relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic recognizes the need 
to establish a special status for Chechnya, as part of Russia, and to adopt a substate 
constitution and other legislation. The latter would establish the institutional framework of 
the Republic of Chechnya, according to this agreement, though there are no guidelines for 
creating such a framework. No later agreement mentioned the institutional structure to be 
adopted by the Republic of Chechnya, and it took until 2003—during the second Chechen 
war—for the constitution to be adopted.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Two of the constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina—the Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—were established before the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina was signed in 1995, while the third—the 
Brčko District—was established post-Dayton and currently functions according to the 2008 
Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see also Gavrić, Banovic ́  and 
Barreiro 2013: 23). The Federation was established after a peace agreement, and Republika 
Srpska through a bid for independent statehood. The Serb deputies of the former People’s 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a separate assembly—the Assembly of the 
Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina—in opposition to the declaration of independence of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that the former assembly had approved. The newly created 
Assembly of the Serb People adopted the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia 
Herzegovina—Republika Srpska—in February 1992. This constitution had to be amended 
after the Dayton agreement. The 1994 Framework Agreement for the Federation 
[Washington Agreement] established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed 
of Bosniacs and Croats. Section III of the agreement provides minimal direction regarding 
the constituent cantonal governments—the executive authority, the legislature and the 
judiciary—including that the cantons shall have their own constitutions but must act 
consistently with the Constitution of the Federation. In June 1994 the Constitutional 
Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Constitution of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Part V on ‘The Cantonal Governments’ it states 
that each canton shall have a constitution, ‘which shall provide for: (1) the institutions 
described below; and the protection of the rights and freedoms described in this 
Constitution’ (art. 4). The constitution then details the structure and some of the procedures 
for decision-making of the cantonal legislature (art. 5-7, V.2.7A, V.2.7B), the cantonal 
executive (art. 8–19) and the cantonal judiciary (art. 11). The 1995 Dayton Agreement, 
which included the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Annex IV, did not further 
constrain the constitutional space of the entities with regards to system of government, 
structure of the state, or bicameralism versus unicameralism.
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Indonesia
In Indonesia, as part of the post-Suharto decentralization reforms, two provinces—Aceh and 
Papua—were granted ‘special autonomy’ status under specific legislation, and pursuant to 
chapter VI on ‘Regional Authorities’ of the 1945 (as amended through 2002) Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia. Therein it states that Indonesia is a unitary state divided into 
provinces (art. 18(1)). These provinces, and other constitutive parts (e.g. regencies and 
municipalities) will have power over their own affairs (art. 18(2)), and will include an elected 
Regional People’s House of Representatives (art. 18(3)) and elected heads of regional 
governments (art. 18(4)). Regional authorities will exercise wide-ranging autonomy (art. 
18(5)), and ‘shall have the authority to adopt regional regulations and other regulations to 
implement autonomy and the duty of assistance’ (art. 18(6)). The constitution further 
regulates the relationship between the central government and the regional authorities of the 
provinces, regencies and municipalities, as well as among the latter. Without mentioning 
Aceh and Papua, the constitution states that ‘The State recognises and respects units of 
regional authorities that are special and distinct, which shall be regulated by law’ (art. 
18B(1)). The central-state constitution, however, does not specify the structure and 
functioning of the institutional framework at the substate level. In 2001, the president of 
Indonesia decided to stipulate special autonomy laws in both autonomous provinces; the 
drafting followed negotiations between state and substate stakeholders. These special 
autonomy laws specify the institutional structure of both provinces, including their legislative 
and executive powers as well as special courts for distinct communities. In Papua, the 2001 
Special Autonomy Law gave substate authorities a higher degree of decision-making power—
at least on paper—than many other provinces had even after the systematic decentralization 
process in the late 1990s (see Chauvel 2010: 313). On 15 August 2005, the Government of 
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 
enhance Aceh’s autonomy and powers. The memorandum confirms the separation of powers 
between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (art. 1.4.1), and the fact that there 
will be an independent and impartial court system, including a court of appeals, to function 
within the judicial system of Indonesia (art. 1.4.3). These provisions are further developed in 
the 2006 Law on Governing Aceh.
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Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)
The 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement states that the Bougainville executive and legislature 
will, in consultation with each other, establish both a Constitutional Commission (to prepare 
a draft constitution) and a Constituent Assembly (to debate, amend and adopt the draft 
constitution) (art. 14). The Constitutional Commission is separate from (not appointed by) 
the Constituent Assembly.
South Africa
In South Africa, provincial legislatures are allowed to propose provincial constitutions, and 
have to adopt the text by a two-thirds majority (art. 142 of the Constitution of South 
Africa), but it is unclear whether they used appointed drafting committees for the actual 
drafting.
Russia
In Russia, the substate ‘legislative bodies’ are responsible for adopting the charters of krays, 
oblasts, cities of federal significance, an autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs  (art. 
66(2)). It is unclear whether the same body is also in charge of (drafting and) adopting the 
constitutions of the constituent republics. Regarding republics, the Constitution simply says 
that ‘The status of a republic shall be determined by the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation and the constitution of the republic’ (art. 66(1)).
Sudan and South Sudan
In Sudan it is unclear whether the (Northern) state legislatures used appointed drafting 
committees to do the actual drafting. The Protocol between the Government of Sudan and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Power Sharing (26 May 2004) states that the 
state legislatures should ‘prepare and adopt state constitutions provided that they are in 
conformity with the National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and for Southern States, 
also in conformity with the Constitution of Southern Sudan’ (art. 4.4.4). The protocol also 
calls for establishing a National Review Commission to prepare model constitutions for the 
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substate entities (art. 2.12.11; see also Murray and Maywald 2006: 1219). However, it is not 
clear whether  these model constitutions were used in (Northern) Sudan or how  they were 
used, or whether the debates took place within the state legislatures or outside.
The protocol further established a 14-member committee for South Sudan (in December 
2005 and January 2006) that drafted a model interim constitution for the substate entities of 
South Sudan, which was presented to drafting committees from all ten states at a conference 
in Rumbek (South Sudan) (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1222–24). ‘Once the state drafting 
committees had collectively agreed on a final version of the Model, each committee 
considered that version and made amendments that they believed were important for their 
individual state’ (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1229). After this, the drafting committees then 
presented the draft constitution to their governors, who presented it to their respective 
Council of Ministers and State assemblies. The state assemblies then reviewed and amended 
the draft and adopted a final version (Murray and Maywald 2006: 1229).
Ethiopia
In Ethiopia the state legislatures were responsible for drafting and adopting the substate 
constitution. The State Councils are the substate entity’s legislatures, and while the 
constitution does not specify how they are selected, the electoral law confirms they are 
popularly elected. The State Council, according to the Constitution, is the ‘highest organs of 
State authority. It is responsible to the People of the State’ (art. 50(3)). The 1995 
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia states that the State Council 
‘has power to draft, adopt and amend the state constitution’ (art. 50(5)). However, it is 
unclear which body or individuals deliberated on and drafted the substate constitutions 
(Regassa 2009: 52). According to Ayele (2014: 91), ‘all levels of governments in Ethiopia are 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one party the Ethiopia People’ Revolutionary 
Democratic Party’, which might indicate a centrally-led drafting process in the substate 
entities. Furthermore, the 2000 amendment process of the substate constitutions took place 
in the president’s office, ‘on his order, and without involving the regional authorities; indeed, 
it took place without their knowledge’ (Ayele 2014: 105). The constitutional space might 
have existed on paper, but the substate entities were unable to use it.
Indonesia (Aceh)
In Aceh (Indonesia), while drafting was the responsibility of the substate legislature, adoption 
was the responsibility of central-state institutions. The 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement 
establishes that the legislature of Aceh is responsible for redrafting the legal code for Aceh 
(the 2001 law on special autonomy for Aceh) (art. 1.4.2). It appears, however, that ‘the 
provincial government took over from the provincial parliament and finalized the draft with 
the help of an advisory team of legal experts’ (May 2008: 43), before submitting the draft to 
the central government, which substantially reviewed it before submitting it to the 
Indonesian lower house (May 2008: 43). Article 20 of the Indonesian Constitution states 
that the lower house has the authority to establish law, and each bill has to be discussed by 
this body and the president to reach joint approval. Once both parties jointly approve, the 
president signs the bill into law. If the president does not sign within 30 days after approval, 
the bill automatically becomes law. The lower house used this opportunity to review and 
reformulate the draft to make it conform to existing laws and regulations (May 2008: 43).
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Bosnia and Herzegovina
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, two of its three constitutive entities—the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska—predated the Dayton Agreement and therefore the 
central-state constitution (Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement). The Serb deputies of the 
former People’s Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a separate assembly—the 
Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia and Herzegovina—after boycotting the vote on a 
‘Memorandum on Sovereignty’ for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Assembly of the Serb 
People adopted the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina—what 
would later be called Republika Srpska—in February 1992 (Sahadžić 2013: 12–13). This 
constitution had to be amended after the Dayton Agreement. The Washington Agreement—
which established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—provided for a Constituent 
Assembly to promulgate its constitution, but approval of this constitution required consensus 
‘between the delegation of the Croat people, comprising all representatives of Croat 
nationality, and the delegation of the Bosniac people, comprising all representatives of 
Bosniac nationality’ (section VII). Section VIII of the Washington Agreement states that 
‘The two parties agree to establish a high-level Committee which will prepare a draft 
Constitution of the Federation and coordinate other matters related to the implementation 
of the Framework Agreement. The Committee will start its work in Vienna on March 4, 
1994.’ In the 1994 Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, section V on 
Cantonal Governments states that each canton shall have a constitution (art. 4), and the 
cantonal legislature shall ‘prepare and by a two-thirds majority vote and approve the 
Cantonal Constitution’ (art. 6(a)). The constitution does not stipulate which body has 
drafting responsibility.
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constitutions and agreements
‘Agreement: An Inclusive Interim Administration for the South West Regions of Sonmalia 
(Bay, Bakol and Lower Shabelle)’, 22 June 2014, <http://peacemaker.un.org/somalia-
interim-admin-southwest-14>, accessed 10 October 2017
‘Agreement between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Jubba Delegation’, 27 August 
2013, <http://peacemaker.un.org/somalia-jubba-delegation2013>, accessed 10 October 
2017
‘Agreement on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the 
Chechen Republic’, 14 December 1995, <http://peacemaker.un.org/russia-
relationschechenrepublic95>, accessed 10 October 2017
Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001, <http://peacemaker.un.org/png-bougainville-
agreement2001>, accessed 11 October 2017
‘Central Regions State Formation Agreement (Mudug and Galgaduud)’, 30 July 2014, 
<http://peacemaker.un.org/somalia-centralregions2014>, accessed 10 October 2017
Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, <https://
www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994.pdf?lang=en>, accessed 
11 October 2017
Constitution of South Africa, 1996, <http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/
SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Framework Agreement for Reconciliation in Comoros [Fomboni Agreement, unofficial 
translation], 17 February 2001, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/
com20010217.pdf>, accessed accessed 11 October 2017
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia Herzegovina, 1995, <http://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgreement.pdf>, 
accessed 10 October 2017
‘Indonesia: Law No. 21 of 2001, On Special Autonomy for the Papua Province’, 2001, 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/46af542e2.html>, accessed 10 October 2017
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Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993, 27 April 2014, <http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/
sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/transitions/safrica/
SA_19_Interim_Constitution.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005, <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/
docs/c_SouthernSudan.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan, 6 July 2005, <http://
www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ba749762.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan [amendment], 4 January 2015, 
<http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ba749762.pdf>, accessed 11 October 2017
‘Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 11 of the Year 2006 Regarding Governing of 
Aceh’, 2006, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/968EN.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 1 August 2012, <http://
hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Somalia-Constitution2012.pdf>, accessed 10 October 2017
Transition Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, <https://
www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf>, accessed 
10 October 2017
Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, 2004, <http://peacemaker.un.org/
somalia-transitionalcharter2004>, accessed 10 October 2017
Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, 22 July 1991, <http://www.constitutionnet.org/
sites/default/files/ethiopia_transitional_period_charter_of_ethiopia_1991-1995.pdf>, 
accessed 11 October 2017
United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Letter dated 29 November 1995 
from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’ [General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia Herzegovina, Dayton Agreement], A/50/79C; S/1995/999, 30 November 
1995
United Nations, Security Council, ‘Letter dated 3 March from the Permanent 
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations, 
Addressed to the Secretary General’ [Framework establishing a Federation, Washington 
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